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Major Professor: Paul R. Gregory
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of 
devaluation of the British pound in 1967 on the British balance of 
trade. This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part 
examines the theory of devaluation. The second part is an empirical 
study of the British devaluation in 1967. The method used is that 
of regression analysis.
Our study finds that the main determinants of exports of the 
United Kingdom are the income of the other countries and relative 
prices. Our findings as to the importance of lagged effects of 
relative prices on the level of exports of Britain shed some light 
on the current literature of the international price adjustment 
mechanism. With regard to imports, our study finds that the main 
determinants are income and changes of inventories of the United 
Kingdom. As to the lack of importance of relative prices, our 
findings are not inconsistent with those obtained by other investi­
gators. We also find that the effectiveness of devaluation was 
supported by other policy changes aimed at curtailing absorption.
Our findings indicate that the empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical arguments of both the price-elasticities and income- 
absorption approaches.
Our study has found that the export performance of the United 
Kingdom has improved to a certain degree since devaluation but the 
import showing was rather poor. The explanation for the moderate 
export performance is that the underlying ability to export was 
deteriorating rather sharply just before devaluation. The more 
serious this deterioration, the larger the corresponding devaluation 
effects have to be to offset it. As regards the continuous growth 
of imports after devaluation, our study finds that it was due to 
the fact that the relative price variable was not a significant 
determinant of imports in the case of Britain and that the elasticity 
of imports with respect to price was fairly low. Furthermore, the 
abnormal increase in silver and diamond imports, the effect of the 
1967 dock strike, the increase in the propensity to import, and 
special factors all were other countributory factors.
To sum up, the countribution of devaluation toward alleviating 
Britain's balance of payments problem in the 1967-69 period was 
small, other than its effect in reversing the speculation against 
sterling. Though the effects were small, we do not know what the 
development of Britain's international transactions would have been 
if she had not devalued. In the negative sense of preventing 
deterioration of the British international balance, the devaluation 
of 1967 might have made some contribution.
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THE EFFECTS OF DEVALUATION ON THE BALANCE OF TRADE:
THE CASE OF BRITAIN IN 1967
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The theory of the price mechanism of the balance of pay­
ments is as old as economic theory itself. But even Taussig 
confessed "we still have pheonomena not fully understood."^
Though considerable theoretical and empirical progress has been 
made, we are still not able to solve Taussig’s puzzle. Jaroslav 
Vanek holds this view when he writes:
Significant advances in this field of analysis have been 
made in recent years. By no means is it possible to say, 
however, that this treatment of the adjustment mechanism 
is consiste and definitive. A good deal of work is needed 
in this field, both in order to supply the polciy maker with 
answers he needs to face present-day problems of international 
payments and in order to satisfy our scientific curiosity.^
It is believed that a study of the devaluation of an indi­
vidual country can be made by "finding pieces and bits which will 
help shed some light on the price mechanism."^ At least, we hope
^Frank Taussig, International Trade Theory (New York: The 
MacMillan Coitpany, 1927), p. 127.
^Jaroslav Vanek, International Trade: Theory and Economic
Policy (Homewood, Illinois: R.D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), p. 54.
^A.C. Harberger, "Some Evidence on the International Price 
Mechanism," Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 65 (February, 1957), 
pp. 506-521.
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it will contribute some additional information. With this idea in 
mind, the purpose of this dissertation is to study the effects of 
devaluation of the British pound sterling in 1967 on the balance of 
trade of the United Kingdom.
The effects of the devaluation are examined in terms of the
1967-68 and 1967-69 periods. It is difficult to isolate the effects 
of other policy changes which were undertaken simultaneously with 
the devaluation. In fact, most of the policy changes were presum­
ably part of the general policy of the government. The effects of
factors unrelated to the policy of devaluation are isolated to
whatever extent possible or are assumed to be zero for the sake of
simplicity.
The method used in this thesis, in part, is one of compar­
ing trade in a period of post-devaluation with a period of pre­
devaluation. Wherever possible, comparison of trade bettveen the 
United Kingdom and the countries which devalued or did not devalue 
will be made.
The heart of this analysis is found in chapters 5 and 6, 
which follow the regression method used by Johnston and Henderson.*̂  
Using the regression analysis approach, import and export functions 
are constructed in an attempt to obtain as good an explanation as 
possible of the movement of imports and exports before devaluation. 
We then use these functions to estimate what imports and exports 
would have been in the absence of the devaluation. Thus, the
*̂J. Johnston and Margaret Henderson, "Assessing the Effects 
of the Import Surcharge," lynchester School of Economic and Social 
Science, Vol. 35 (May, 1967), pp. 90-109.
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effectiveness of the devaluation is analyzed in terms of the re­
siduals which appear between estimated and actual values of imports 
and exports.
This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first 
part critically examines the theory and policy of devaluation. The 
second part is an empirical study of the devaluation of Britain in 
1967. A brief outline of each chapter is as follows:
The introductory chapter presents the objectives of this 
study, and the methodology to be used.
Chapter II explains and critically evaluates the causes of 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments and the remedies to cure 
it. We also examine the price-elasticities approach, the income- 
absorption approach and their partial reconciliation in an attempt 
to present the theoretical foundation for the empirical study.
Chapter III investigates the economic situation of the 
United Kingdom on the eve of devaluation and the alternative poli­
cies, which the United Kingdom might have taken to correct the 
deficit in its balance of payments.
Chapter IV analyzes and examines the effects of devaluation 
on exports. Several aggregate export functions with different 
independent and dependent variables are constructed. The export 
function is then used to estimate what exports would have been 
without devaluation. The effectiveness of devaluation as regards 
exports is then estimated by comparing the actual value of exports 
with these predicted values.
Chapter V investigates the effect of devaluation on imports. 
The procedure is similar to that of the preceding chapter.
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Chapter VI attempts to assess the effects of devaluation 
upon expenditures, income, and the balance of trade. The absorption 
approach to devaluation is stressed in this chapter.
Chapter VII contains a summary of the principal findings of 
this study and a statement of the conclusions which may be drawn 
from it.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND AND THEORY OF DEVALUATION 
In this chapter, we examine and critically evaluate the 
causes of disequilibrium in the balance of payments and the 
remedies to cure it. Our special attention is centered on exam­
ination of the price-elasticities approach, the income-absorption 
approach and their partial reconciliation in an attempt to present 
the theoretical foundation for the empirical study in the following 
chapters.
Causes of Disequilibrium in the 
Balance of Payments 
The social and political forces that induce a country to 
follow economic policies that cause balance of payments diffi­
culties vary from country to country and from time to time. But 
the economic causes are all the same. The causes of disequilibrium 
in the balance of payments can be attributed either to monetary 
disturbances— i.e. prevailing inflation or price-cost disparity 
or to real, so-called structural disturbances. Structural dis­
equilibrium occurs when a change in demand or supply of exports or 
imports alters a previously existing equilibrium or when a change 
occurs in the basic circumstances under which income is earned or 
spent abroad, in both cases without the requisite parallel changes 
elsewhere in the economy.
5
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Disturbances caused by monetary practices, such as infla­
tion and price-and-cost disparity, can be dealt with effectively 
by means of monetary policy or exchange rate adjustment while, in 
the case of structural disturbances, it is conceded that when some 
of them can not be corrected by means of monetary measures, other 
measures are required.^
It, however, is important to note that the cause of infla­
tion may be social programs imposed by political necessity, or it 
may be due to psychological reasons fed by non-economic factors or 
to the immediate inflexibility existing in the economy. Under such 
circumstances, the balance of payments problem is not a monetary 
problem which can be corrected by deflation and devaluation.
To sum up, each individual case of disequilibrium must be 
studied separately to discover the particular cause. Furthermore, 
the causes and the measures adopted must be analyzed and evaluated 
within a general economic framework which includes the domestic 
economy along with the foreign sector and not for sole purpose of 
correcting the disturbance in the balance of payments.
Policies Available to Cure Disequilibrium
There are several ways to cure a disequilibrium in the bal­
ance of payments. In this section we will center our investigation 
on the following major policies: (1) deflation or expenditure-
reduction, (2) direct controls, and (3) exchange-rate adjustment. 
The details of the operation of these policies are discussed below:
iR.G. Hawtry, The Balance of Payments and the Standard of 
Living (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950), p. 3.
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Other Policies
Expenditure-Reducing Policy. A policy of expenditure re­
duction, or reduction of aggregate demand, can be implemented by 
the standard macro procedures such as tax increases, higher interest 
rates and reduced government expenditures. Such policies affect 
both expenditures and output. Expenditure is directly affected, 
and part of this reduction falls on domestic production, in turn 
setting off a multiplier effect which curtails expenditure and out­
put still further. Consequently, the unfavorable effect will be 
smaller the more the initial reduction in expenditure falls on 
imports. So long as the marginal propensity to spend is less than 
one, the net effect of an expenditure-reducing policy must be an 
improvement in the balance of payments.
Direct Controls. A policy of direct controls is usually 
applied to restrict imports, in which case there will be a ten­
dency for frustrated domestic consumers to buy domestic substitutes 
and for domestic producers to seek to produce domestic substitutes 
for imports no longer available. Thus import restriction tends to 
switch domestic expenditures toward domestic goods. Controls may 
also be applied in order to stimulate exports. In this case, the 
aim is to induce foreigners to switch their expenditures to domes­
tic output.
Direct controls may be of great significance if other 
measures to correct the balance of payments fail. Direct con­




A devaluation or an expenditure-switching policy shifts 
expenditures away from foreign-produced goods and towards domes­
tically produced goods. This result is achieved either by varying 
the exchange rate or altering the price level. Such switches of 
expenditure will increase domestic output, and so long as the 
marginal propensity to spend is less than one they will improve 
the balance of payments. In other words, devaluation, by making 
the country’s goods relatively cheaper compared with foreign goods, 
will tend to switch both domestic and foreign expenditure towards 
domestically-produced goods and in turn improve the balance of 
payments.
In the case of expenditure-switching policy, the aim is to 
increase the demand for domestic output. This raises the question 
of where the extra output required to meet this additional demand 
comes from. In this connection, we have to consider two possible 
cases for analysis.
The first case is that of a country with widespread unemploy­
ment, the switching policy will switch demand towards domestic out­
put and in turn will give rise to increased domestic output and 
income by increasing the utilization of unemployed resources. The 
second case is that in which the deficit country has conditions of 
full enployment, then the policy of switching expenditure should 
be backed by a complementary policy of reducing domestic demand-- 
a combination of an expenditure-switching and an expenditure- 
reducing policy. The switching policy in this case is used as a
trimming device to ensure that a balance of payments equilibrium is
2achieved without sacrificing full employment. An expenditure- 
reducing policy tends to lead to unemployment because expenditure 
would have to be curtailed sufficiently to cut down demand for
imports enough to correct the deficit. This thus implies a reduc­
tion in demand for domestic output; so the switching policy is used 
here as a means to direct the reduction in spending entirely on to 
imports.
Elasticities Approach to Devaluation
The conventional answer to the effect of devaluation on 
the trade balance of the devaluing country runs in terms of the 
supply and demand conditions in the devaluing country and in the 
rest of the world. It is presumed that devaluation initially tends 
to reduce the foreign prices of the country's exports in proportion 
to the devaluation. At these reduced prices, foreign demand for the 
country’s exports will be increased, thus tending to bid up the 
foreign prices of these exports part-way back to their predevalu­
ation levels. To what extent the foreign currency proceeds of the 
country’s exports will change then depends upon the elasticity of 
foreign demand for the country’s exports and the elasticity of 
domestic supply of exported goods. By the same token, on the im­
port side, the initial effect of the devaluation is to raise the 
domestic price of imports, presumably leading to some reduction in 
the country’s demand for imports, which in turn may tend to reduce
^Harry G. Johnson, Money, Trade and Economic Growth 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 19-20.
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the world price of the imported goods. The magnitude of the impact 
on imports depends upon the elasticity of foreign supply of imports.
The Stability of Exchange Rate 
If the devaluation is to have a favorable impact upon the 
balance of trade, the sum of the elasticities of home demand for a 
country's exports and of its demand for imports must be greater 
than one. This is called the Marshall-Lerner condition or the 
exchange-rate stability condition.
Insofar as these conditions are crucial to the later empir­
ical chapters, let us consider exchange-rate market stability fur­
ther. Consider only two countries, and Yg and let m^ and m2 be 
the elasticities of demand for imports in the two countries. Simi­
larly, let e^ and eg be the elasticities of supply of exports. If 
the discrepancy between exports and imports is small, relative to 
the total value of foreign trade, it can easily be shown that a 
devaluation of the currency of either country in proportion K will 
bring about a change in that country’s balance of payments on cur­
rent account (dB), which has the following value, relative to the
3value of exports.
f nil mp (1 + + ê ) + (m̂  + mg - 1)
dB = K (m̂  + 6g) (mg + ê )
The foreign exchange market is stable if the expression in 
brackets is positive, for exchange stability requires that devaluation
^Lloyd A. Metzler, "The Theory of International Trade," in 
Survey of Contemporary Economics, ed. by Howard S. Ellis (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1952), pp. 226-227.
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must increase a country’s net supply of foreign exchange. The value 
in the right-hand of the equation will be positive if (1) the sum 
of m̂  ̂and (hg is greater than one; or (2) the sum of m^ and m2 is 
less than one but the elasticities of supply and e^ are suffi­
ciently low to make the second term of the numerator smaller than 
the first term.
This analysis concentrates on the price effect of exchange 
adjustment, assuming away secondary effects through income change.
If we incorporate the income effect, then the stability criterion 
that emerges from this is that the sum of the elasticities of demand 
for imports and exports must be greater, not only one, but than one 
plus the sum of certain complex factors employing the direct and 
indirect effects of a change in income on expenditure.
The Effect of Devaluation on Prices of Exports
Given a percentage devaluation of a country’s currency, 
there will be a tendency for foreign-currency prices of exports to 
fall. Export prices will fall by the percentage of devaluation, or 
by less, or not at all depending first, on the inport content of 
exports, in which case the higher the inport content the less prices 
of exports will fall (this is because inport prices will rise after 
devaluation), and second, on the elasticity of supply of exports.
The greater the elasticity of supply of exportable goods of the 
devaluing country, the less will be the rise of domestic prices 
following devaluation. For a devaluing country with many resources 
idle, output can be increased with little, if any, increase in costs 
and prices. If supply is infinitely or near infinitely elastic.
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export prices in terms of domestic currency in home market will 
remain constant or rise very little; in foreign markets, they will 
fall in proportion to the home currency’s devaluation, or a little 
less.
The Effect of Devaluation on Prices of Imports 
Given a percentage devaluation, domestic prices of imports 
will increase by the amount of devaluation on the assumption that 
the total imports of the devaluing country constitute a small pro­
portion of the world total. For exangle, the British share of the 
total world market inports is usually very small. Exceptions will 
occur when the foreign manufacturers are willing to reduce the pro­
fit margins on his exports to the devaluing country’s market. In
such cases, the supply elasticity may be considered infinite. In
general, the more insignificant the home market in the total for 
a commodity, the higher the supply price elasticity of that commod­
ity in the British market. Certain commodity prices are determined 
by world rather than home markets and the world price will remain 
unaffected by the devaluation of one country. If the supply 
elasticity is not infinite, then the import price is going to rise
less than full amount of the devaluation. This will also happen 
if some of the imports are supplied by a country which has devalued 
its currency along with the United Kingdom.
Effect of Devaluation on the Value of Exports and Imports 
After examining the effect of devaluation on prices of ex­
ports and imports, and its relationship to their elasticities, we 
will turn to look at the effect of devaluation on the value of
13
inports and exports. We can easily visualize that the impact of a 
devaluation on exports is to shift the demand curve upward. Every 
unit of foreign currency exchanges for more units of local currency, 
so that devaluation shifts the foreign demand curve upward. The 
upward shift of the demand curve for exports, expressed in local 
currency, raises the local-currency value of exports. With exchange 
devaluation, the local currency value of export cannot drop. At 
worst, if the demand curve is completely inelastic, i.e., straight 
up and down so that an upward shift could not be seen, the value 
of exports in local currency would remain unchanged.
Devaluation may, however, increase, reduce, or leave un­
changed the 1ocal-currency value of imports. Devaluation involves 
an upward shift in the supply curve. Whether the value of inports 
will rise, fall, or rrrnain unchanged depends on the elasticity of 
demand for imports. If this elasticity is unity, the value of 
imports remains unchanged. If it is less than one, it will increase. 
If it is greater than one, it will fall.
The conventional price-elasticities analysis, however, is 
an extension to inports and to exports as a whole of the familiar 
Marshiallian supply and demand analysis of a single commodity.
Partial elasticities measure the effect of a change of price on 
the quantity supplied or demanded when all other things remain 
equal. Total elasticities relevant to a devaluation measure corre»- 
sponding relationships when the other things have changed that are 
likely to change as a result of devaluation. Accordingly, Alexander 
contends that elasticities do not measure the direct effects of
14-
price changes on the quantity, but the covariation of prices and 
quantities as the whole economic system seeks a new equilibrium. 
Therefore, a devaluation depends on the behavior of the whole econ­
omic system, and the effect of a devaluation depends on how the
Lj.economic system behaves. We will examine Alexander’s theory of 
income-absorption as an approach to devaluation in the following 
section.
The Income-Absorption Approach
The income-absorption approach was developed by Sidney 
Alexander. His argument is that a country’s net foreign trade 
balance is equal to the difference between the total goods and 
services produced in that country and the total goods and services 
absorbed domestically. To express this concept in an equation, we 
have:
B = Y - A
where B is balance of payments, Y is the total production, and A 
is absorption required to cover the domestic expenditure items- 
consumption, domestic investment and government expenditure. This 
relationship holds both in real and in money terms. To avoid cer­
tain difficulties, it is convenient to conceive output and expend­
iture in real rather than monetary terms. Thus, the income- 
absorption approach in this case implies constant prices.
With less than full enploymeftt, the balance of payments 
can be improved by increasing output more than absorption. But 
with conditions of full-employment the possibilities of improving
^S.S. Alexander, ’’Effects of a Devaluation on a Trade Bal­
ance,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 2 (April, 
1952), pp. 2b3-ü/b.
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the balance of payments by devaluation turn on whether absorption 
can be decreased or not. The mechanisms by which exchange devalu­
ation can improve the balance of trade are as follows:^
The Effect of Devaluation on Income
Idle Resources Effect. The principal effect on real income 
resulting from a devaluation is through the increased exports of 
the devaluing country and the induced stimulation of domestic demand 
through the export multiplier.
Resource Réallocation Effect. There is also another possi­
bility, which Alexander neglected, of expanding real income by 
means of devaluation through resource reallocation.® Assume a bal­
ance of payments deficit with full employment. The exchange rate 
is overvalued. This means that resources have been drawn out of 
exports and import-conçeting goods into non-trade domestic line. 
Correcting the exchange rate leads to resource reallocation which 
improves real income.
Terms of Trade Effect. If devaluation affects the terms of 
trade, the change in the terms of trade will affect national income 
and absorption. The terms of trade effect can be divided into an 
initial effect through price changes and a secondary effect through 
income-induced changes in absorption. According to Alexander, the 
Initial terms of trade effects upon the trade balance and upon real 
Income are equal in direction and magnitude. If this is true, then
®Ibid.
®Frits5 Machlup, "Relative Prices and Aggregate Spending 
in the Analysis of Devaluation," American Economic Review. Vol. 
(June, 1955), pp. 255-278.
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the ultimate terms of trade effect upon the trade balance is obtained 
by multiplying the initial (t) by marginal propensity to save,
(1-m). Hence, the ultimate terms of trade effect upon balance of
trade would be (1-m)t, and thus could be positive only if (1-m) is
negative, that is, if m is greater than one.
Substitution Effect. This is the effect of shifts in rela­
tive prices and the effect of price increases which reduce real 
absorption even if absorption in money terms should be unchanged.^
The Effect of Devaluation on Absorption
Effects of devaluation on the balance of trade, which are 
not associated with changes in income but with changes in the ab-
g
sorption of given income, are called direct effects on absorption.
The direct absorption effect can be divided into a cash 
balance effect, an income redistribution effect, and a money illu­
sion effect.
Cash-Balance Effect. Devaluation raises the domestic 
prices of imports and exports, and it will tend to raise the prices 
of import substitutes, of potential exports, and of intermediate 
goods, required for their production. With a constant money supply, 
an increase in prices and money income may produce a decrease in 
consumption, as consumers try to build back the real value of their 
cash balances which have depreciated because of the rise in prices.
The Income-Redistribution Effect. There may be a redis­




from fixed-income groups, on the other; this may or may not reduce 
aggregate consumption, depending on the relative sizes of the mar­
ginal propensities to consume of the groups concerned, and the way 
in which the redistribution is shared between wages and profits.
The government can, in advanced countries, usually be expected to 
have a low marginal propensity to spend, so that the tax shift 
might be a significant factor influencing the relationship of ab­
sorption to income, and so affecting the foreign balance.
The Money-Illusion Effect. Suppose savings are a positively 
rising function of money income rather than of real income. This 
implies a "money illusion," without reference to the level of prices. 
Under exchange devaluation, the general price level of consumer 
goods will rise. However, since consumers are not to pay attention 
to the changes in prices and since money incomes remain the same, 
they spend the same amount as before. Consequently, their level of 
real consumption spending falls and the result on the balance of 
payments will be favorable.
The income-absorption analysis is particularly relevant 
when a country is at full employment since with full employment at 
home, a devaluation will lead to no significant increase in real 
income. Under this condition, an inprovement in the balance of 
trade depends upon the direct effect of devaluation on absorption 
or upon the simultaneous devaluation, a reduction of absorption 
can be achieved through a deflation policy.
Despite the contributions to the analysis of the effects 
of devaluation which the absorption approach has made, it presents
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as did the elasticities approach only one side of the coin. The 
whole picture of the total effects of devaluation can only be seen 
clearly and analyzed in a comprehensive system in which changes 
in income and prices are all taken into account. With this idea 
in mind, a partial reconciliation of the relative-price and income- 
absorption approaches is presented below,
A Partial Reconciliation of Relative-Price and 
Income-Absorption Approach 
From the analysis in the preceding sections, we find that 
both relative-price and income absorption approaches would agree 
when there is widespread domestic unemployment at home that deval­
uation will improve the balance of trade. The difference of opinion 
arises when there is full employment. The relative-price theories 
would still claim that devaluation is bound to improve the trade 
balance, provided that the sum of elasticities of demand of two 
countries is greater than one. On the other hand, adherents of 
the income-absorption approach would state that this condition is 
not warranted unless it could be shown first that domestic absorp­
tion is reduced.
It has been suggested that a reconciliation of the two 
approaches can be made by showing that if devaluation increases 
prices, it also cuts absorption; or conversely if devaluation does 
not result in the curtailment of absorption, then it also could 
not end up with a relative increase in the prices of exports
19
and inports. If correctly carried out, both approaches must lead
gto the same conclusion.
Suppose devaluation does not reduce the demand for absorp­
tion, then the prices of exports and imports relative to domestic 
prices do not change; that is, the general price level in the deval­
uing country increases in the same proportion as the devaluation. 
Michaely’s argument proceeds as follows:
In the first stage after devaluation relative prices of exports 
and imports rise and the trade balance improves. This means 
that the amount of goods available for domestic absorption is 
smaller than it had been before devaluation (Since it has assum­
ed that output and the terms of trade are not changed by absorp­
tion.) But the demand for domestic absorption has not changed, 
so that (assuming an initial position of equilibrium) there is 
now an excess of aggregate demand for goods and services over 
their aggregate supply, and this tends to raise the price level. 
The excess demand and the tendency of the level of prices to 
rise will prevail as long as the price level has not increased 
in full proportion of devaluation. Only when the general level 
of prices increases as much as the price of foreign exchange, 
and the trade oalance returns to its predevaluation level, are 
we in a new equilibrium position.
In this way, the relative-price approach leads to rue same 
conclusion as the income-absorption approach.
On the other hand, after devaluation the price level will 
rise. On the basis of the Pigou effect, consumption, including 
the consumption of imports, will decline and in turn improve the 
balance of trade.
Thus, an increase in the ratio of external to internal 
prices, which is essential for an improvement of balance of trade
^Michael Michaely, "Relative-Prices and Income-Absorption 
Approaches to Devaluation: A Partial Reconciliation," American
Economic Review, Vol. 50 (March, 1960), pp. lW-147.
10Ib id , t  pi i4 5 ;
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according to the relative-prices approach, can only improve the 
trade balance when there is a reduction of absorption and a de­
crease of absorption can take place only if there is an increase 
in the general price level under the conditions of full employment. 
Therefore, the two approaches to the analysis of devaluation must 
lead to the same conclusion.
The Importance of Lagged Effect of Relative-Price 
and Income on Exports and Imports
The discussion of both theories of relative-prices and
income-absorption approaches are implicitly carried on in current 
terms on the assumption that the effect on trade of a rise in demand
is immediate and that the effect of relative price changes is effec­
tive during the current period. This writer asserts that the lag 
before the full effects are felt is a distributed one— both for the 
pull of demand on exports and imports and for relative prices.
It is a possible hypothesis that when domestic demand rises, 
the immediate impact on imports is, to some extent, delayed. By 
the same token, when the demand of foreign countries rises, the 
immediate inçact is on their home products and the impact on the 
devaluing country’s exports is, to some extent, delayed. Possibly 
a greater proportion of inserted than of home-produced goods are 
subject to contract, so that it takes time for increased demand to 
lead to increased supplies. Furthermore, any sharp rise in demand 
leads, after a time, to a sharp increase in stock-building; and 
later still, to a rise in demand for plant and machinery. It is 
likely that the share of imported manufactures in final expenditure
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on stock-building and on plant and machinery is higher than their 
share in other final expenditure i t e m s . B o t h  these factors might 
lead to a lag in the relationship between the movement of manufactur­
ing production and the movement of imports and exports.
In the same way, it is often argued that, because of inertia 
and lack of knowledge for example, the effects of a change in rela­
tive prices will be spread over a long period of time. To discuss 
this, we can begin our discussion by recalling the well-known dis­
tinction between short-run and long-run elasticities of demand.
That is, whenever a demand schedule is drawn in theory, it refers 
to some specified period of time. In the very short-run when habits 
are persistent, the demand schedule will be completely inelastic 
with respect to changes in price. The more time we permit for 
adjustment to prices changes, the more elastic the demand schedule 
will be.
The point we are trying to stress is that the adjustment 
of quantity depends on the past history of price changes and the 
sequence of prices within the relevant period as well as the total 
price change within the period. Thus, the central question that 
conce us here is the effect the time pattern of adjustment of 
quantity to changes in price has on the statistical estimating 
procedures. To neglect this point might cause misjudgment of the
^^In the United Kingdom, the import content of finished manu­
factures appears to be significantly higher in stock-building than 
in other final sale. See W.À.H. Godley and J.R. Shepherd, "Fore­
casting Imports," National Institute Economic Review, No. 33 (Aug­
ust, 1965), p. 39. Estimates of the share of imports in fixed ex­
penditure on household equipment and personal effects are given for 
major industrial countries over the period 1956-62. See Wilfred 
Beckerman et al., The British Economy in 1975 (Cambridge, England: 
University Press, 1965), p. 162.
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effect of relative-prices on exports and imports in the empirical 
studies.
Summary
The causes of disequilibrium in the balance of payments can 
be attributed either to monetary distrubances--i.e. prevailing in­
flation or price-cost disparity or to real, so-called structural 
disturbances.
The major national remedial measures to cure external im­
balances are expenditure-reducing policies, controls of trade, and 
devaluation. The remedy chosen to cure the balance of payments 
problem should be selected in the light of the cause of the imbal­
ance.
Both the relative-price approach and the income-absorption 
approach to devaluation have their own merit. The relative-price 
analysis uses partial equilibrium elasticities and assumes other 
things, including income, equal. Similarly, the income-absorption 
analysis uses models which usually require an assumption of unchanged 
prices. Both are inadequate by themselves. When the elasticities 
approach is generalized to include changes in spending, or the absorp­
tion approach is expanded to include changes in prices, they merge 
into one another.
On the other hand, the elasticities approach can be broad­
ened from partial-equilibrium analysis to include income changes, 
or the absorption approach can be broadened to include the effects 
of price changes in absorption. In either case, they become iden­
tical. In other words, there can be no neat dichotomy of the final
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effect of a devaluation into a part that consists of the absorption 
solution and another that consists of the elasticities solution.
The total effects must be analyzed in a comprehensive system in which 
changes in income and prices are all taken into account.
Both theories implicitly carried out assume that the effect 
of a rise in demand on the balance of trade is immediate and that 
the impact of relative price changes is effective during the current 
period. This writer asserts that the full effects of demand and 
relative price changes on imports and exports may be distributed 
over a period of time. The pattern of these lagged effects must be 
determined empirically. A neglect of this point could cause the 
wrong conclusions to be drawn on the importance of the effect of 
changes in relative prices on exports and imports in the empirical 
studies.
To sum up, the trade balance is mainly a function of two 
variables, relative prices and income of the current period and 
past periods. On the basis of this theoretical background, the 
case of British devaluation in 1957 will be taken up to examine how 
well etipirical evidence supports this model in the following chap­
ters.
CHAPTER III
INTERMEDIATE DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO 
THE BRITISH DEVALUATION
Prior to evaluating the effect of the November 1967 British 
devaluation on exports and Imports, we examine the economic situa­
tion of the United Kingdom on the eve of devaluation and the alter­
native policies which the United Kingdom might have taken to rectify 
the deficit in the balance of payments.
An Overview of the British Balance of Trade
If we look at the British trade balance over a long sweep 
of history, at no time during the last two centuries did British 
exports of merchandise consistently equal or exceed imports of 
merchandise. Generally only about three quarters of imports were 
covered by exports, over the entire period of the last two centur­
ies, only six years of export surpluses were recorded, and two of 
these occurred in the last ten years. The traditional ways of 
covering the trade deficit and resources which were made available for 
capital exports—invisible earnings— have lately not been adequate. 
Two world wars have eroded the shipping, insurance, and financial
services, and particularly the dividend and interest earnings from
foreign investment that provided invisible surpluses. Thus it may 
be that Britain requires a trade surplus today even though it was
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not necessary previously. The amount of surplus required depends 
on how much Great Britain must transfer in net capital outflows, 
including debt repayment, and aid to other countries. Thus a fixed 
target cannot be stipulated.
Between 1952-54, the average trade deficit was about L250 
million; in 1956-58 there was rough balance in the trade accounts; 
in 1961-63 an average trade deficit of about LlOO million appeared; 
and in 1964 the trade deficit increased to over fc500 million and 
produced a crisis. Thus there was improvement through 1958, some 
deterioration from 1958 to 1963 and then sharp deterioration. Not 
only did Britain not develop the trade surplus needed to cover 
capital exports; they had to use other resources to cover a growing 
merchandise deficit. From 1964 to mid-1967, the trade balance im­
proved in response to domestic restraining measures but then deteri­
orated sharply and became a major ingredient in the decision to 
devaluate.
The Performance of Exports
There is some superficial evidence to suggest that Brit­
ish exports have not increased satisfactorily, possibly indicating 
a loss of competitiveness in the world market. As indicated in 
Table 1 and Table 2, British exports of manufactures have grown at 
about the same rate as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Taken 
together with a rising import/GDP ratio, a constand export/GDP 
implies a deterioration of the trade balance for the United Kingdom. 
If the growth of British GDP were greater than that of other 
countries, this combination need not imply a deterioration of
TABLE 1
RATIO OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURES GOODS TO GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCTS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1956-66 
(Lbillion and percent)
Gross Domestic Product 
and Type of Ratio 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
Gross domestic product 
Current prices 18.2 19.3 20.1 21.2 22.6 24.2 25.2 26.7 28.8 30.7 -32.1
Constant prices (1958) 19.8 20.2 20.1 20.8 21.9 22.7 22.9 23.8 25.2 25.9 26.3
Ratio of exports of 
manufactured goods to 
gross domestic product 
in 1958 prices 14.2 14.3 13.9 14.2 14.1 14.1 14.0 14.1 13.8 14.1 14.2
Ratio of inports of 
manufactured goods to 
gross domestic product 
on 1958 prices 4.1 4.4 4.5 5.0 6.3 5.9 6.1 6.3 7.4 7.6 7.9
Source: Central Statistical Office, National Income and Expenditure (London: H.M. Stationery
Office, 1965, 1966, and 1967).
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TABLE 2
RATIOS OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS 
TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES FOR 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN FREE 










Luxembourg 17.5 28.0 26.1 35.3
France 3.3 7.2 7.3 9.4
Germany 5.0 7.1 14.2 15.3
Italy 4.6 9.9 7.5 14.1
Netherland 23.2 32.5 19.0 25.2
EFTA
Austria 13.6 19.2 15.0 17.6
Denmark 18.3 24.6 8.9 12.5
Norway 25.2 26.1 12.4 15.9
Portugal 14.8 15.3 7.3 10.9
Sweden 15.3 18.5 13.3 17.7
Switzerland 16.1 21.8 20.6 21.1
United Kingdom 4.7 7.4 14.1 13.8
Sources : United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics, Series 
D, 1957 and subsequence years; Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, National Accounts Statistics, 1955-64 (Paris: OECD, 




DISTRIBUTION OF EXPORTS OF ^U\NUFACTURFS FOR ELEVEN
COUNTRIES, 1953-67 
(Lbillion and percent)
Country 1953 1955 1957 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
Total exports 
of all eleven 
countries
11.0 12.3 15.5 16,8 19.1 20.3 21.5 23.3 26 .6 29.7 33.1 41.5
Percent of Total
united Kingdom 19.1 19.4 17. 8 16-7 15 .5 15.2 14.7 14.5 13.3 13.4 12.9 11.9
United States 36.1 29.1 29 .7 24.1 23 .9 22.7 23.0 22.2 22.4 20.8 20.2 20.7
W. Germany 
Belgium-
11.9 15.3 17.3 18.5 18.7 19.7 19.5 19.8 19 .4 19.1 19.5 19 .6
Luxembourg 5.8 6.5 6.0 5.8 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.7
France 8.1 8.9 7.9 8.9 9.2 9.2 9.0 9.0 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.4
Netherlands 4.3 3.8 3.5 4.0 4.0 4.6 4.1 4.2 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.4
Sweden 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 4.4
Switzerland n . a . n . a • n • â « 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2
Canada 6.1 6.0 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.6 4.6 5.2 5.9
Italy 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 5.0 5.5 5.8 5.9 6.3 6.7 6.9 6.9
Japan 3.4 5.1 5.9 6.4 6.8 6.7 7.3 7.6 8.2 9.4 9.8 12.2
Sources: Organization for Co-operation and Development, Commodity Trade 
Statistics, Series C (Paris: OECD, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1968); United Nations, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statist)cs (New York: United Nations, 1960, 1965, 1968).
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British competitiveness. But this was not the case. In particular. 
The British experience has not been characteristic of other EFTA 
or EEC member countries. A somewhat closer look at the performance 
of British exports can be obtained by comparing British manufactur­
ing exports with those of other industrial countries. As shown on 
Table 3, the British share of the total exports of manufactured 
products of eleven leading exporting countries declined from about
19.3 percent in period 1953-55, to 16.6 percent in 1958-60, and to
13.7 percent in 1963-65. By 1967, the British share had declined to
11.8 percent. This decline could have resulted from a loss of com­
petitiveness.
The Performance of Imports 
In examining inports, one is really evaluating the performance 
of industries conpeting with imports. Two categories of imports—  
raw materials and foodstuffs— can be considered noncompetitive with 
domestic supplies since they supplement rather than compete with 
British natural resources. While there are some interesting short- 
run questions of inventory changes and raw materials and foodstuffs, 
most attention can be directed to conpetitive inports of manufactured 
products. Manufactured products have been taking an increasing per­
centage of the United Kingdom inports: 25.5 percent in 1955, 36.8
percent in 1960, and # . l  percent in 1965. The more useful compari­
son, however, is between manufactured imports and the United King­
dom’s production of inport-eonpeting goods. In Table 1, imports of 
manufactured products are shown as a percentage of GDP at constant 
prices. This percentage has clearly been rising and is affected by
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cyclical pressures in the economy. During a period of rapid growth, 
1958-60, the import ratio increased as one might expect but did not 
decline when demand pressures eased in the economy. These figures 
give a hint of a loss of competitiveness of import-competing in­
dustries, but only superficially and perhaps not significantly.
British Competitive Position in the World Market
The slow growth of Britain’s exports raises the question 
of her competitive ability in overseas markets. A revealing way of 
looking at her position is in terms of the distribution of the world 
market for manufactured goods among various countires in 1966 com­
pared with 1954. This is shown in Table 4. It is clear that so far 
as proportionate achievement is concerned, Britain’s performance 
between 1954 and 1966 is the poorest of the industrial countries 
listed here, her share of world trade in manufactures having fallen 
by 7 percentage points. There are special reasons for the deteri­
oration of certain markets, e.g., the ending of Commonwealth prefer­
ence, but the inescapable conclusion is that Britain’s competitive 
position in world markets has been steadily weakening, a trend re­
flected her loss of competitiveness with imports in her own home 
market.
It is not a simple matter to explain this loss of competi­
tiveness, still less to illustrate it with statistical material. 
There are, however, two factors which are relevant; industrial 
productivity and the level of prices— in particular, export prices. 
Changes in productivity and prices are not independent, increase 
in prices usually being less where increases in productivity are
TABLE 14-
WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, FOR 195if AND 1966








Japan 2.26 9.7 4.7 +4.7
West Germany 4-.50 19.3 14.8 +4.5
Italy 1.60 6.8 3.2 +3.6
Netherlands 1.04 4.4 3.8 +0.6
Sweden 0.77 3.3 2.8 +0.5
Belgium-Luxemberg 1.40 6.0 6.2 +0.2
France 1.99 8.5 9.0 -0.5
Switzerland 0.75 3.2 3.8 -0.6
Canada 1.20 5.2 6.3 -1.1
United States 4.78 20.5 25.1 -4.6
United Kingdom 2.99 12.8 20.4 -7.6
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics > Vol 21
'June, 1967) ,  p. xx.
greatest. It is, therefore, illuminating to compare changes in the 
United Kingdom with those in other countries. The National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research of Great Britain has calculated 
index numbers of productivity and export prices for a number of 
major countries, and figures for 1956 and 1966 are given in Table 5.
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TABLE 5
INDEX NUMBERS OF OUTPUT PER MAN-HOUR IN MANUFACTURING 
1960 = 100, AND EXPORT PRICES OF MANUFACTURES, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1958 = 100,
FOR 1956 AND 1966
Output per Man-Hour in 
Manufacturing






Japan 86 158 81̂ 101 91 -10
W. Germany 81 132 62 99 112 14
Italy 87 167 97 101 94 -7
France 81 13L̂ 65 102 106 4
United States 85 121̂ 46 94 109 16
United Kingdom 87 122 40 96 117 22
Source: National Institute of Economie and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 4-2 (November, 1967), Appendix.
The countries are listed in the same order iü which they 
appear in Table 4. The first point which emerges is that those 
countries at the top of the list, i.e., those which have increased 
their share in the world market of manufactures, have all experienced 
considerable increases in productivity; whereas, the United Kingdom, 
whose share in the world market has fallen the most, has shown the 
least increase in productivity among the countries listed. Second, 
with the striking exception of West Germany (where the Deutsch mark 
was revalued in 1961), countries which have increased their share in 
the world market of manufactures have also shown a fall or a slight
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rise in export prices. The United States and the United Kingdom, 
on the other hand, whose shares in the world have fallen most, show 
the greatest increases in export prices. Thus, some part of the 
explanation of the United Kingdom's loss of competitiveness is the 
failure of her industrial productivity to increase as fast as that 
of other countries and the more rapid increase in her export prices .
West Germany had the second greatest increase in shares in 
the world market but her increase in export prices was as high as 
those of the United Kingdom in terms of relative price changes over 
time. Corrpetitiveness depends also on the absolute level of price 
(which is also associated with productivity), on quality, on design 
and styling, and on the certainty of delivery dates, etc.. There 
is, in fact, some evidence that the Britain's lack of competitive­
ness is, in part, to be explained in these terms. Nevertheless, 
the slow growth of industrial productivity seems to be fundamental and 
the most important single factor.
Why Devaluation was Chosen in Favor of 
Other Alternative Policies 
In this section we examine the alternative policies the United 
Kingdom might have taken and why devaluation was chosen in favor of 
other policies in light of the theory we presented in Chapter II.
Richard Cooper has done a study of the balance of payments 
of the United Kingdom.^ Table 6 summarizes the results of his 
study which indicates the impact on the balance of payments of 
several alternative courses of action. The table is set up to indi­
cate the trade-offs among objectives with respect to a given
^Richard Cooper, "Balance of Payments," in Britain's 
Economic Prospects, ed. by Richard Caves and Others (Washington: 
Brookings Institute, 1968), pp. 197-197.
34
improvement In the balance of payments. Thus, for example, to 
avoid a currency devaluation of 1.41 percent requires accepting a 
higher unemployment rate of 0.34 percentage points or a reduction 
in overseas military expenditures by LI43 million. The burden of 
adjustment need not fall on any one item, various combinations are 
possible. While the entries are drawn for an improvement in the 
balance of payments, they can be reversed, indicating that a reduc­
tion in the unemployment rate by 0.34 percent points or an increase 
in foreign investment by LllO million can be expected to worsen 
the balance of payments by LLOO million.
TABLE 6
ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR IMPROVING FOR UNITED KINGDOM 
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BY LlOO MILLION: A SUMMARY
Course of Action
Rise in target unemployment rate 0.34 percentage points
Inposition of import surcharge on
manufactures 4 percent
Reduction in overseas military
expenditures L143 million
Across-the-board in private capital
outflow LllO million
Across-the-board in foreign aid L159 million
Currency devaluation 1.41 percent
Source: Richard Cooper, "Balance of Payments," in Britain's
Economic Prospects, ed. by Richard Caves and Others (Washington: 
Brookings Institute, 1968), p. 196.
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The entries in the table are calculated to yield an improve­
ment of £i 100 million. If 1.4 percent is taken as the target unem­
ployment rate, 1965 was nearly on target in this regard. Stock- 
building was a bit higher than normal, enlarging imports, but this 
effect was more than offset by the normal reflow of British port­
folio capital from abroad, induced in part by government measures 
taken to affect capital flows, and by the presence of a 10 percent 
surcharge on manufactured imports. Growth in GDP was under 3 per­
cent. Thus, according to Cooper, the size of the required adjust­
ment was put roughly at L450 million. Thus, for exanple, the accept­
able unemployment rate would have had to be raised by 1.5 percentage 
points if sole reliance were placed on changing that objective. A 
devaluation of 6.4 percent would have been necessary. They are 
obtained by multiplying the entries by a factor of 4.5.
The British government has understandably and sensibly 
resisted the notion of rigid trade-offs among objectives such as 
those shown here. Before 1967, it also attempted to avoid a direct 
choice among objectives, in part by resorting to a host of measures 
designed to ease conflicts among more basic objectives.
However, the British government avoided hard choices among 
objectives in part also by vacillating among them, shifting in par­
ticular from emphasis on employment to emphasis on the balance of 
payments and back again. In the mid-sixties the British government 
chose more decisively than previously to sacrifice some employment, 
some foreign investment, and some overseas military expenditure to 
help the balance of payments. By late 1967 it appeared that the price 
of maintaining the exchange rate was too high, and the pound was
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devalued by 14- percent, from $2.80 to $2.40. The devaluation of
14.3 percent was expected to create an improvement in the balance 
of payments of over tSOO million on a full employment basis. After 
allowance is made for a reduction in unemployment from the high 
level prevailing in late 1967, the actual improvement would be less.
Summary
The Great Britain’s balance of payments had been deteriorat­
ing since mid-1950’s. The trade balance had deteriorated sharply 
up through November of 1967 and it constituted a major ingredient 
in leading to the decision to devalue.
A close look at the United Kingdom’s export share of manu­
factures in the world market discloses that her share of the world 
market had declined from 11.9 percent in 1953 down to 11.8 percent 
in 1967. In contrast. West Germany and Japan has steadily climbed 
from 11.9 percent and 3.4 percent up to 19.6 and 12.2, respectively. 
This downtrend signaled a warning that something was wrong and some­
thing had to be done.
A devaluation was chosen over the other alternative policies 
because it was the least costly and most effective policy by then.
In addition, the British government chose to sacrifice some employ­
ment to help the balance of payments.
CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECT OF DEVALUATION ON EXPORTS
Having examined the economic background of the devaluation 
and having considered the question of why the policy of devaluation 
was chosen over the other alternatives, we now attempt to measure 
the impact of the devaluation upon British exports. Using the theory 
of devaluation presented in Chapter II, we first construct as good 
an explanation as possible of the movements of exports before the 
devaluation. We then use this function to forecast what exports 
would have been in the absence of the devaluation. The effects of 
other policy changes unrelated to the devaluation are assumed to 
be zero. Thus the effectiveness of the devaluation is analyzed in 
terms of the residuals between forecast and actual exports. (We 
will relax the assunption of zero effects of other policy changes 
in Chapter VI) . A verbal analysis of disaggregated exports by 
commodity and area will be included with the support of numerical 
data in the second part of this chapter.
The simple regression analysis approach has been challenged 
by several writers on the grounds that it tends to underestimate 
the price elasticities.^ Direct attempts to estimate both demand
^See Harberger, op. cit.; Fritz Machlup, "Elasticity Pessi­
mism in International Trade," Economia Internazionale, Vol. 3 
(February, 1950), pp. 118-137; G. Oroutt, "Measurement of Price 
Elasticities in International Trade," Review of Economics and Sta­
tistics. Vol. 32 (May, 1950), pp. 117-138.
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and supply simultaneously, were made by Morgen and Corlett in 1951, 
using data for a number of countries, but with a complete lack of 
success. In other contexts, the application of simultaneous esti­
mation methods, when successful, has yielded results that were al­
most invariably very close to those yielded by the simple regression 
method. It now appears that in practice the single equation bias 
is much less than was first suspected.
This appears to be also the view of Klein, one of the earlier
advocates of the simultaneous equations approach, who writes:
In the quarterly model, all the foreign trade equations have 
explicit time lags of one or more quarters. These lags of one 
or more quarters together with the exogenous character of the 
overseas variables, transform the export-import equations into 
types in which the application of single equations method does 
not lead to bias except that due to the smallness of the 
sample size.^
Determinants of Exports
As was discussed in Chapter II, the price-elasticities 
approach to devaluation stressed that the primary determinants of 
exports are relative prices and demand and supply elasticities.
On the other hand, the income-absorption approach emphasized 
income and expenditure. We argued in Chapter II that the total 
effects must be analyzed in a comprehensive system in which changes 
in income and prices are all taken into account. To integrate
2d .J. Morgen and W.J. Corlett, "The Influence of Price in 
International Trade: A Study in Method," Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society. Series A, Vol. 104, Part III (1951), pp. 307-352.
^L.R. Klein and Others, An Econometric Model of the United 
Kingdom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1962), p. 131.
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both approaches, we postulate the following export model in general 
lagged terms.
(1) = FCYj. Yf.i, ... Yt.„, Pi/P2t_i. ... V^'St.n)
where X: Exports of the United Kingdom in constant prices
Income of the other countries in constant prices 
Index numbers of export price of the United Kingdom 
Index numbers of export price of the other countries 
Time period.
Income is chosen on the basis of the economic reasoning in 
Chapter II. As was stressed by the income-absorption theory, income 
indicates a country’s ability to iirgort from other countries. The 
normal measure of this ability is gross national product. However, 
only a few countries have quarterly figures for gross national 
product. A reasonable proxy for trends in the demand for exports 
of other countries is the index numbers of industrial production (IP) 
The series on total industrial production of the world is taken from 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, published by the United Nations.
This is restrictive in covering only certain sectors of the economy, 
such as manufacturing and mining sectors, but possibly advantageous 
from the point of view of business cycle analysis since industrial 
production is more sensitive than a cyclically sluggish measure 
like gross national product.^
The relative price variable (Pĵ /P2) the ratio of the 
price level of U.K. exports to those of the rest of the world. For
'̂ Ibid.
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the source of data, consult the appendix. The inclusion of the 
relative price variable in the export function has been discussed 
in detail in Chapter II. A country’s export competitiveness or her 
export strength is related to the relative prices and the elasticity 
foreign demand for exports. However, we have to recognize that 
the actual measurement of the price elasticity of demand for a 
country’s exports presents enormous difficulties. In the first 
place, the measurement of their prices is difficult; second, the 
prices of coirçeting foreign goods have to have been taken into account; 
third, the effects of prices have to be sorted out from those of in­
come; fourth, trade barriers of all kinds introduce immeasurable dis­
turbances; and fifth, full-adjustment to price-changes takes place 
only after a time lag which it is difficult to allow for in empiri­
cal investigation.
The Regression Model 
On the basis of the economic reasoning given in Chapter II, 
our formulation of the export regression equation stresses explicitly 
that the regressand responds to changes in explanatory variables 
with a delay. To build an export function with lagged response, let 
us first consider a lagged function with only one explanatory vari­
able (Y) included. The simplest lagged function form of instantan­
eous response is illustrated below:
(2) \  = V t - 1  *
where = exports of the United Kingdom in period t and = income
of the other countries in period t. (We omit the constant term for
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simplicity.) A more general form allows for a distributed lag:
(3)................. + "lYt.l + »2'^t-2 * .+
Let us make the classical assumption about the residual term, in 
particular:
2 2(4) Ee = ̂  : Be e = 0 for m n; Y and e are independent.t m n
Although equation (3) is more general than (2) response of 
a single-period lag, its estimation presents obvious difficulties. 
And there is likely to be multicollinearity among the successive 
regressors. Some sort of restriction to specify a priori that the 
coefficients of the successive Y's decline geometrically is needed 
as we go further back in time :̂
(5) bĵ = bh^ (k = o, 1, 2 ___ )
where 0<h<l, so that the relationship may be written
(6) = bY^ + hbY^  ̂+ h^bY^_2 + ----+ ê
The point is that if we lag (6) one period and multiply through 
by h we obtain
(7) hXt_i = hbY^_^ + h^bYt_2 + h^bY^_^ + . . . . +  he^_^ 
which when subtracted from (6) gives, after rewriting
(8) = bY^ + hX^_^ + (e^
Adding the effect of relative price in lagged form on the level
^See L.Kyock, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Inc., 1954^, pp. 25-45.
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of exports and the constant variable, equation (8) becomes
(9) + 1=2 (V f 2 ) t ^ “ t-1 + ( S  - V - l )
If (e^ " ^ t  1̂  satisfies the classical assumptions, this model 
becomes a straight regression model.
However, the suitability of a geometrically decaying lag 
structure of income and relative prices is open to criticism. It 
seems reasonable that adjustments to a price change would build up 
slowly rather than decay. Therefore, it may be useful to consider 
the somewhat more general approach for the relative price lag struc­
ture, attributable to Jorgenson.^ According to Jorgenson, if we 
include lagged values of the explanatory variables and additional 
lagged values of the dependent variables, we can produce a very 
general lagged response. Accordingly, the export equation
(10) x^ = + b„Yj + b^CP/Pg)^ + C„Y^_^ + =lCVf2)t-i + “ t-1
allows the current coefficients to be completely free, while all 
lagged responses form a geometrically declining series governed by 
the adjustment coefficient h. Clearly the multicollinearity has 
been mitigated as a result.
If we substitute index of industrial production (IP) for 
income (Y) and allow the one-period lagged coefficients to be 
completely free, while the lagged response of all other periods 
form a geometrically declining series represented by the adjustment 
coefficient h, then equation (10) becomes,
(11) + b„IP^_^ + ̂ ffl/''2)t-l + "o“ t-2 + =l<''l'̂ 2>t-l "“ t-1
6D.W. Jorgenson, ”A Rational Distributed Lag Function," 
Econometrica, Vol. 32 (January, 1966), pp. 135-149.
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The Regression Results
The forecasting equation (11) is fitted to the 19601 to
1967II period using quarterly data. The estimated equation below
2is chosen because it gives the most satisfactory results. R 
denotes the multiple coefficient of determination, and S the standard 
error of the regression. The standard errors of individual co­
efficients are listed in parenthesis below the corresponding 
coefficients. For the sources of data, consult Appendices 1 and 2.
(12) = 914.933 + 2.389 IP^_^ - 580.246 (Pi/P2)t_l +
(22.922) (1.815) (215.402)
1.921 IP^_2 - 209.681 (P^/Pg)t_2 + 0*307 
(1.587) (182.209) (0.228)
= 0.95 Durbin-Watson statistic =1.57 S= 4.8
The results conform well to a priori expectations: the
2value of R is statistically significant, and the standard error of 
the equation is statistically small. In addition, the signs of the 
individual coefficients are all internally consistent and in accord 
with the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter II.
Our results confirm the importance of lagged effects which 
we postulated in the theoretical chapter. The unusual finding of 
a significant lagged effect of the relative price variable on the 
price level of exports sheds some light on the current literature 
on the international price adjustment mechanism. A brief survey of 
past empirical studies in the area will help us understand better 
the significance of these findings.
Klein, by using a simultaneous model, found in only one of 
the estimated equations, that of the United Kingdom's exports to 
the dollars areas, could the relative price elasticity be considered 
of the right sign and statistically significant.^ Polak worked with 
25 countries for the interwar period and found only thirteen countries' 
export equations with price elasticities of substitution with proper 
signs but with insignificant elasticities.® Neisser and Modigliani 
found relative prices significant in ten out of thirty-seven cases, 
with elasticities ranging from -0.19 to 1.2.^ Junz and Rhomberg 
found a wrong sign of elasticity of substitution between exports of 
Britain and other industrial countries.Reton estimated the rela­
tionship between the value of United Kingdom manufactures exports 
and relative prices but found it insignificant.^^ Ball, Eaton, and
Steur found relative prices insignificant in their studies of United 
12Kingdom exports.
^Klein, op. cit., pp. 126-128.
QJ.J. Polak, An International Economic System (London: Allen
and Unwin, Inc., 1954-), pp. 157-169.
9Hans Neisser and Franco Modigliani, National Income and 
International Trade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953),
pp. 100-120.
Junz and R.R. Rhoiriberg, "Prices and Export Performance 
of International Countries, 1953-63," International Monetary Fund 
Staff Papers, Vol. 12 (July, 1965), pp. 224-271.
^^G.A. Renton, "Some Projections for United Kingdom Exports 
on Manufactures," National Institute Economic Review No. 37 (August, 
1966), pp. 25-36.
^^R.J. Ball, J.R. Eaton, and M.D. Steur, "The Relationship 
Between United Kingdom Export Performance in Manufactures and the 
Internal Pressure of Demand," Economic Journal, Vol. 76 (September, 
1966), pp. 501-518.
Our findings indicate that if lagged effects are considered, 
the whole picture changes. Price effects become significant. Our 
findings also demonstrate that the empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical arguments of both relative-prices and income-absorption 
approaches presented in Chapter II.
One of the purposes of the estimated regression equation is 
to estimate the impact of the various regressors on regressand. In 
the next section, we will estimate the effect of devaluation on the 
level of exports using equation (12).
The Effect of Devaluation on the Level 
of Exports
Our approach is to use the estimated regression equation (12) 
to forecast what exports would have been in the absence of devaluation. 
The effectiveness of the devaluation is thus analyzed in terms of 
the residuals which appear between predicted and actual exports.
The residuals are obtained by inserting the actual values 
of the explanatory variables on the right-hand side of the equation 
assuming that the 1967 price ratios would hold in the forecast 
period. Thus, we obtain the level of exports expected in the ab­
sence of devaluation in the various quarters. By subtracting the 
expected level from the actual level of exports, we measure the im­
pact of devaluation on exports. The results are given in Table 7.
As the figures show in Table 7, the British exports rose 
around 5 percent which was attributed to the effect of devaluation, 
in 1968. These estimated values are close to those forecasted by
TABLE 7
THE ACTUAL, PREDICTED, AND RESIDUAL VALUE FROM 
THE EXPORT FUNCTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
19671 TO 1969IV 
(Seasonally adjusted, quarterly data, Lnun, 1958 price)
Year Actual Value Predicted Value Residuals
1968 I 1,221.0 1,094.7 126.3
II 1,223.0 1,191.3 31.7
III 1,336.0 1,193.4 142.6
IV 1,365.0 1,239.5 125.5
1969 I 1,342.0 1,263.7 78.3
II 1,W3.0 1,269.2 143.8
III 1,467.0 1,316.3 99.7
IV 1,4-87.0 1,352.6 134.4
Source: Computed from Equation (12). For Date Consult
Appendix I.
National Institute Economic Review before devaluation 13 The rise
of exports was about 8.5 percent in 1969 which was lower than ex­
pected. A possible explanation is that the underlying ability to 
export was deteriorating rather sharply just before devaluation.
The more serious any such deterioration, the lower exports should be 
without devaluation and thus the larger would any corresponding 
devaluation effects have to be to offset it.
13National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 4̂3 (February, 1968), p.33,
1+7
Now let us look at the United Kingdom share of trade after 
devaluation. As indicated in Table 8, the United Kingdom share 
of the trade had resumed its slightly downward trend in 1969 after 
a period of relative stability in 1968. Nevertheless, the total 
annual decline after devaluation was the smallest since 1961. This 
implies that price advantages have played some role in offsetting 
the deterioration.
TABLE 8
UNITED KINGDOM SHARE OF WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES
(Seasonally adjusted)
Year I II III IV Year
1967 12.8 12.2 12.1+ 10.4 12.2"
1968 11.6 11.3 11.2 11.2 11.3
1969 11.2 10.9 11.4 11.2 11.2
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 52 (May, 1970), Appendix, 
Table 20.
Disaggregated Exports by Commodity and Area 
Having examined the exports of United Kingdom after devalu­
ation in aggregate term, we now turn to look at the disaggregated 
exports. As Table 9 shows, the 18.1 percent rise in textiles ex­
ports was the highest, whereas the 11.1 percent increase in the 
metal goods exports was the lowest in 1968. Nevertheless, in 
1969 machinery export rose 12.4 percent compared to a 5 percent 
rise in metal goods, which was the lowest. The commodity
TABLE 9
UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS, BY COMMODITY, 1966-69 












Chemicals 123 131 6.5 150 14.5 163 8.7
Textiles 96 93 -3.1 108 16.1 120 11.1
Metal goods 105 108 2.8 120 11.1 126 5.0
Machinery 
(Transport & 
Equipment 112 105 -6.2 121 15.2 136 12.4
Others 122 124 1.6 144 16.1 170 18.1
Total 107 111 3.7 127 14.4 142 11.9
Non-Manufactures 107 109 1.9 126 6.4 129 2.4
Source: Calculated from: National Institute of Economie and Social Research,
National Institute Economie Review, No. 51 (February, 1970), Statistical Appendix, Table 16,
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TABLE 10
UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS BY AREA, 1966-69 
(Seasonally adjusted, tmillion)
Country









United States 629 616 -1.28 880 92.80 872 -0.91
Canada • 200 216 -1.80 250 22.60 300 15.30
EEC 956 969 0.88 1196 29.50 1912 18.60
EFTA 790 760 3.29 856 12.60 1090 21.50
Other Sterling Area 1588 1528 -3.77 1760 15.20 1989 12.70
Other Primary Goods 
Producers 508 512 0.79 600 36.70 829 17.70
Eastern Europe 198 168 13.50 229 33.30 228 1.78
Total Industrial 
Countries 2800 2820 0.71 3500 29.20 9009 19.90
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, National Institute
Economic Review, No. 51 (February, 1970), Statistical Appendix, Table 16.
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classifications (not in Table 9) which experienced particularly 
large proportionate rises were road vehicles and miscellaneous man­
ufactures.
In terms of destination, it appears that the largest increase 
of exports in 1959 was to Japan, France, and to the nations of the 
European Free Trade Area. Exports to Ireland and Mainland China had 
a large rise as well. However, exports to Eastern Europe and 
Austria remained unchanged, and there was a fall in exports to the 
United States, whose fight against domestic inflation required the 
reduction of imports. The decline was also associated with the 
American dock strike, anticipation of which drew exports into 1968 
which otherwise would have been recorded in 1969.
The Effect of Devaluation on the Export Prices 
As we pointed out in Chapter II, it is to be expected that 
export prices would rise as a result of devaluation. In this sec­
tion, we investigate the magnitude and the causes of the rise of 
export prices after devaluation. Export prices have risen for 
several reasons. First, the abolition of the export rebate at 
the beginning of April, 1967 (about 2 percent) caused export prices 
to rise. Second, the direct rise in costs resulting from the in­
crease in import prices (about 2.5 percent) also had an effect. 
Finally, there was some rise in wage costs over and above the in­
creases which would otherwise have taken place. All this led ex­
port costs to rise by about 7 percent. In addition a number of
19-National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 92 (November, 1967), p. 6.
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TABLE 11
INCREASE IN EXPORTS PRICES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
AND THE EFFECT OF DEVALUATION 
(Percent, 1967 to 1968)
Actual Increases: January-September




Of which. Attributed to
Normal Factors Devaluation
Chemical 6.0 1.0 5.0
Textiles 2.5 1.0 1.5
Metals 9.5 7.0 2.5
Machinery and Transport 
Equipment 7.8 2.0 5.8
Other Manufactures 10.0 1.5 8.5
Total Manufactures 7.5 1.5 6.0
Non-Manufactures 5.0 -1.0 6.0
Total Exports 7.3 1.5 5.8
Source : National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. M-6 (November, 1968), p. 21.
export firms raised profit margins instead of reducing their prices. 
In fact, quite a number took the view that price reductions, in 
foreign currency terms, would not increase demand, and it would be 
rational for them to raise their prices in sterling by the full 
amount of devaluation. This also raised the export prices by another 
2 percent. Altogether, export prices rose about 9 percent above the 
level they would otherwise have reached.
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This gives an eventual net advantage over prices in non­
devaluing countries of about 5 to 6 percent (subtracting the esti­
mated 9 percent rise in export prices from the devaluation advan­
tage of 14-.3 percent). This is consistent with the figure shown 
in Table 11.
Analysis of Export Performance 
The objective of this section is to examine the changes in 
the competitiveness of United Kingdom exports since devaluation.
It is not surprising that in the immediate aftermath of the 
devaluation the United Kingdom share of trade in value terms of 
foreign currency declined even faster than before. This is due to 
the fact that the export prices are expected to fall in terms of 
foreign currency after devaluation. However, before long gains 
would be made in the quantity of exports which would be more than 
sufficient to outweigh the effects of lower prices.
In fact, some of these expectations appeared to have been 
fulfilled. The fall in the United Kingdom’s share of trade in value 
in the year after devaluation was steep. As is shown in Tables 8 
and 12, the share of British manufactures declined from 11.5 per­
cent in 1967 to 11.3 percent in 1958 and 10.8 percent in 1969.
A Comparison of Export Performances of the 
OECD Devalued Countries 
In the case of the United Kingdom, in the first year after 
devaluation the benefits were few. The five OECD members which 
devalued in 1967, all but Spain have a poorer performance in terms
TABLE 12
VOLUME OF WORLD AND UNITED KINGDOM EXPORTS OF 
MANUFACTURES, 1956-68 
(Value in $U.S. billion at 1963 price)
Year World U. K. U. K..Share
1956 93.0 8.3 19.3
1957 96.0 8.5 18.6
1958 95.2 8,2 18.1
1959 99:1 8.5 17.2
1960 55.1 9.0 16.3
1961 57.1 9.2 16.1
1962 61.0 9.3 15.2
1963 65.6 9.8 19.9
1969 73.8 10.2 13.8
1965 80.9 10.7 13.3
1966 88.0 11.1 12.6
1967 93.2 10.7 11.5
1968 108.3 12.2 11.3
1969 139.6 19.6 10.8












Share in Total Exports 
Countries (percent)






1.962 1967 1968 1969
Denmark 1.63 2.17 2.58 2.91 10.3 1.2 11.7 1.82 1.71 1.62 1.58
Iceland 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 5.0 -15.1 37.5 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.06
Ireland 0.1+9 0.78 0.80 0.89 11.8 3.1 11.2 0.55 0.55 0.51 0.12
Spain 0.73 1.38 1.58 1.90 17.8 11.5 20.3 0.82 0.93 0.92 1.03





88.82 110.67 158.72 183.30 11.7 12.7 15.5 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Calculated from: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Main
Economic Indicators, April, 1970.
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of export shares after devaluation than before. In fact, not merely 
their exports in value have risen more slowly than before, but at 
the same time the rate of increase in the value of total OECD ex­
ports has accelerated, as shown in Table 13. The fact that the 
exports of these countries, other than the United Kingdom, have a 
high agricultural content may detract from the relevance of this 
comparison. It is nevertheless striking.
Summary
In this chapter we have found that the movement of United 
Kingdom exports is statistically correlated with the movement of 
world income, which is measured by the index of world industrial 
production.
Our analysis of the impact of relative-prices on exports 
confirms the importance of lagged effects which we postulated in 
the theoretical chapter. The unusual finding of the significant 
effects of relative prices on the level of exports sheds some light 
on the current enpirical literature on the international price 
adjustment mechanism. Our findings indicate that if lagged effects 
are considered, the whole picture of past empirical studies could 
be different.
Our findings also demonstrate that etiçirical evidence sup­
ports the validity of the theoretical arguments of both the relative- 
price and income-absorption approaches presented in Chapter II.
Our estimated figures indicate that the effect of the devalu­
ation on British exports was to increase exports by M-.5 percent in 
1968 and by 8.5 percent in 1969, both of which are not very encour­
aging results. The explanation of the moderate increases in
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exports is that the underlying ability to export was deteriorating 
rather sharply just before devaluation. The more serious the deter­
ioration, the larger the corresponding devaluation effects have to 
be to offset it.
Our study, however, finds that the share of trade of United 
Kingdom resumed a slight downward trend in 1959 after a period of 
relative stability in 1968. The total decline in the share of trade 
after devaluation was, however, the smallest since 1961. The 
serious deterioration of exports before devaluation could cause a 
worse balance of trade without devaluation. This implies that price 
advantage has played some role in offsetting the deterioration.
Having investigated the effect of devaluation on exports, 
in the next chapter we will take up the empirical study of imports.
CHAPTER V
THE EFFECT OF DEVALUATION ON IMPORTS
By using the same method as in the previous chapter, this 
chapter attempts to evaluate empirically the effect of the 1967 
devaluation on British imports. Using the economic theory of Chap­
ter II, an aggregate import function is estimated both to test the 
general validity of the theory of imports and to measure the impact 
of the devaluation on imports. A verbal disaggregate analysis sup­
ported by numerical data is included in the second part of this 
chapter.
The Import Function 
In Chapter II, we indicated that imports are a function of 
the prices of the home country relative to the prices of other coun­
tries and income of the home country. As we indicated earlier, we 
postulated an import function in which the regressand responds to 
changes in the explanatory variables with a delay. We further post­
ulate two additional determinants of imports— the level of domestic 
demand and the changes of stockbuilding— each of which is explained 
below. We then have the following equation in general lagged terms:








imports of the United Kingdom, 
income of the United Kingdom,
the domestic price level of the United Kingdom, 
the price of imports from the other countries, 
inventory changes 
time
Following the Godley-Shepherd study,^ we break down imports 
in equation (1) into imports geared to domestic demand activity (M̂ ) 
and imports for stockbuilding purposes . For M^, the first 
problem is the choice of explanatory variables. On the basis of 
the economic reasoning given in Chapter II, we first must consider 
whether indicators of total economic activity, such as gross national 
product; indicators of total sales, such as personal consumption 
expenditures, or possibly a mixture of consumption and income indi­
cators should be used.
As a first step, let us take private consumption expendi­
tures as our indicator of domestic demand activity. Then we shall 
later determine whether significant improvements can be made by 
using a more extensive set of explanatory variables. This method 
is, of course, a rough first approximation, but it may be justified 
on two grounds: first, the importance of consumption as the major
component of economic activity and; second, the fact that decision 
makers in other fields often appear to base their forecasts on 
improvements in consumption. We then postulate
\/.A.H. Godley and J.R. Shepherd, "Forecasting Imports," 
National Institute Economic Review, No. 33 (August, 1965), pp. 35-42.
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(2) = f(C,, Pi/P2^,
where indicates the level of private consumption expenditure in 
period t, P^/Pg^ indicates the price in the home country relative 
to the other countries.
Using the simplest possible form of relationship between 
imports and current consumption expenditures and relative prices, 
we have:
(3) = %o + ^l^t ^2CV^2)t + "t
where is the residual term. If a^ were negative, imports would 
be an increasing proportion of consumption expenditure, and if a^ 
were positive, they would be a decreasing proportion.
Since combining equation (3) and equation (5) gives the most 
satisfactory results in our experiments with various lagged terms, 
we decide to stick to the combination.
Now let us look at M2 . The stock-building element in im­
ports will be geared to changes in inventories:
*
TO = bo (St -
where 8^ denotes the desired inventory for the end of quarter t 
and ^ the actual level at the end of quarter (t-1).
The desired level of inventories is of course unknown, and we can 
deal with the problem simply be substituting
dS = (S - S ) for 8* - 8 ) in the econometric analysis, whicht tr t-1 t t—1
amounts to assuming that
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(5) dS^ = (S* - S^_^) +
with E (ê ) = 0. The actual inventory is thus assumed to vary randomly 
about the desired change.
Adding and we obtain the following equation:
(6) = a^ + a^C^ + a^ (Pj_/P2) ̂  + e^
The Regression Results 
The forecasting equation (6) has been fitted for the 19601 
to 1967III period. The estimated equation is presented below:
(7) M = -825.39-90 + 0.3778 C + 317.1087 (P^P^) + 0.397^^8
(278.9215) (0.0957) 361.9522) (0.2155)
2R =0.89 Durbin-Watson statistic =1.89 S = 7.13
The estimated equation is chosen on the basis of the magni- 
2tude of R and the standard error of the estimate of the regression
and individual coefficients.
The statistical results confirm well to a priori expectations. 
2The value of R in the equation is statistically significant, and 
the standard error of estimate is statistically small. In addition, 
the signs of the individual regression coefficients are all intern­
ally consistent and all significant except for the relative price 
variable. It follows that gross national product, personal con­
sumption, and inventory changes are significant determinants of im­
ports in the case of Britain.
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As to the lack of importance of relative price changes, our 
findings are not inconsistent with those obtained by other investi­
gators. J. Johnston and H. Henderson failed to estimate a signifi­
cant relationship between the value of United Kingdom imports and 
2relative-prices. Polak found that for some two dozen countries in 
the interwar years, imports variations were not significantly deter­
mined by relative prices.^ Neisser and Modigliani, even though they 
broke down the import statistics into major commodity groups, found 
prices to be significantly related to imports in only three out of
LL19 cases.
We also compute the price elasticity using the formula, 
dM/d(P^/Pg) . (P^/Pg)/M, from this estimated equation. Our estimated 
price elasticity is 0.24-, which is close to that estimated by 
Neisser and Modigliani.^
It may be helpful to attempt to explain the lack of im­
portance of price substitution in the imports of the United Kingdom. 
In the demand for raw materials, and food, there is very little 
room for substitution between imported and domestically produced 
goods, therefore, the elasticity of substitution is low.
2j. Johnston and H. Henderson, op. cit.
^Polak, op. cit.
^Neisser and Modigliani, op. cit.
^Ibid.
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The Effect of Devaluation on the Level 
of Imports
As indicated in the preceding chapters, the residuals are 
obtained by inserting the actual values of the explanatory variables 
in the right-hand side of the equation (7), assuming that the 1967 
values of the price ratio would hold in the forecast period. Thus, 
we obtain the level of imports to be expected in the absence of 
devaluation in the various quarters. By subtracting the expected 
level from the actual level of imports, we measure the impact of 
devaluation on imports. The residuals are given in Table 14 below:
TABLE 14
THE ACTUAL, PREDICTED, AND RESIDUAL VALUES FROM 
THE IMPORT FUNCTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
19671 TO 1969 IV 
(Seasonally adjusted, quarterly data, Bmm, 1958 price)
Year Actual Value Predicted Value Residuals
1968 I 1,643.0 1,477.9 165.1
II 1,624.0 1,456.0 165.0
III 1,645.0 1,449.1 195.9
IV 1,655.0 1,516.9 138.8
1969 I 1,650.0 1,489.2 160.8
II 1,652.0 1,474.8 177.2
III 1,659.0 1,473.5 185.5
IV 1,663.0 1,561.1 101.9
Source: Calculated from Equation (7)
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The figures shown in Table 14- carry no indication of an 
immediate effect on imports in the two years after devaluation.
Imports did not slow down because of devaluation, but increased 
strongly. As a result, the residuals obtained from equation (7) 
have the wrong sign. This can be explained by the fact that the 
relative price variable is not a significant determinant of British 
imports. The lower elasticity of imports with respect to relative 
price (only 0.24) furnishes a further explanation. As we discussed 
in Chapter II, devaluation may increase the local-currency value of 
imports if elasticity of demand for imports is less than one. Con­
sequently, devaluation did not reduce British imports. This obviously, 
is due to the fact that the United Kingdom imports quite a lot of 
raw materials which can not be produced domestically.
The figures in Table 14 indicate that the level of imports 
exceeded expectations partly because of the growth of final demand 
in equation (7), but further analysis suggests that the rise in the 
volume of imports was excessive in relation to the rise in demand, 
and this implies that additional explanations must be sought. Some 
may be termed ’special factors’ explanations— abnormal increases in 
silver and diamond imports, the effect of the 1967 dock strike and 
speculative stock accumulation.
In addition, the effect of devaluation on imports may have 
been smaller than it had been conventionally assumed, or the under­
lying import propensity may have undergone a sturctural change.
Some combination of all these possibilities may make up the full 
explanation.
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The kind of equation which was used with some success in this 
study and others in the past to measure the aggregate propensity to 
import still gives significant underestimation of import volumes 
even before any devaluation effect is incorporated. The amount of 
underestimation involved seemed to have begun to diminish very 
slightly during the course of 1969, being due to a noticeable slack­
ening in the rate of growth of the volume imported in 1969.
In the past, this kind of approach was quite compatible 
for evaluating the impact of either devaluation or import surcharge.
The main reasons for the slower growth in imports can be found in 
the slower growth of final demand, and, at least in the second half 
of the year, in the marked decline in stockbuilding.
The Disaggregate Analysis
Devaluation on November, 1967, was followed by a series of 
policy changes designed to restrain domestic expenditures. These 
other policies would also have an impact on imports. The estimation 
in the previous sections was made by using the certeris paribus assump­
tion. We will take this into consideration in the next chapter. 
However, it is worthwhile to examine the disaggregated itiport data, 
particularly for imports of goods, to see whether these provide any 
explanation in 1968.
Among the imported goods in the 1967-68 period, as shown in 
Table 15, the most marked increases were in basic materials (10 
percent) and even noticeably in semi-manufactured goods (13 percent), 
where the relevant indicators of demand for such products— industrial 
and manufacturing production--rose by 4.5 percent and over 5 percent.
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respectively. Even food imports rose by the comparatively large 
amount of 13 percent, against a rise in consumer's expenditure on 
food of 3 percent.^ In total, the volume of imports of goods in 
the year after devaluation increased by 9 percent or well over S 
points faster than the growth in GDP.
Analysis of commodity groups suggests that a certain pro­
portion of the total rise in imports can reasonably be attributed 
to the influence of 'special factors.'
The rise in the food, beverages, and tobacco category was 
caused by an increase in tobacco imports (up by 18 percent), which 
presumably reflected a massive replenishment of stocks following 
the earlier rundown after the Rhodesian crisis. The rise in food 
imports was also due to the 'Hangover' of the 1967 dock strikes 
and to the poor 1967 harvest.^
In basic materials, the rise in fuel imports owed something 
to the restoration of stock positions as hopes of an early opening 
of the Suez Canal faded and the use of giant tankers made alterna­
tive routes round the Cape of Good Hope less expensive,
In the semi-manufactures groups, imports of silver and plat­
inum, and of diamonds, pearls, and precious stones accounted for
g
30 percent of the t 520 million additional imports.
^National Institute of Economic and Social Research,




THE VOLUME OF UNITED KINGDOM COMMODITY IMPORTS BY MAIN CATEGORY, 1967-68 
(Indices, 1961=100, and percentage change on previous auarter,
seansonally adjusted)
1967 1968 1967 1968
Category
Qi 02 03 ^4 Qi 9.2 ^3 O 4 Year Year
Food, etc. 105 108 102 102 113 105 105 106 104 107
Percentage change 2.9 -5.6 -- 10.8 -7.1 1.0 3.0
Basic Material 97 102 102 105 109 112 112 111 102 111
Percentage 5.2 — 2.9 3.8 2.8 — — -0.9 9.5
Fuels 172 158 153 181 165 178 180 185 166 177
Percentage change -8.1 -3.2 18.3 -8.8 7.9 1.1 2.8 6.6
Manufactures 164 167 157 172 186 178 189 188 165 203
Percentage 1.8 -6.0 9.6 8.1 -4.3 6.2 -0.5 12.3
Semi-Manufactures 159 162 151 164 179 174 189 185 159 182
Percentage 1.9 — 6. 8 8.6 9.1 -2.8 8.6 -2..1 14.3
Finished Manufac­
tures 190 194 184 203 217 203 208 213 193 210
Percentage change 2.1 -5.2 10.3 6.9 -6.5 2.5 2.4 9.8
Total Imports 132 133 127 134 144 141 144 144 132 143
Percentage change 0.8 -4.5 5.5 7.5 -2.1 2.1 9.3
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, National Institute 
Economic Review, Vol. 47 (February, 1969) , p. 16.
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TABLE 16
CHANGES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IMPORTS BY MAIN COMMODITY GROUP, 1968-69
(Seasonally adjusted)
1968
Change on Previous Period
1969 Ql 02 Q 3 °4
Food, beverages and tobacco
Value B million +138 +34 + 7 +25 -33 + 3
per cent + 8 + 2 + 2 + 5 - 7 + 1
Volume per cent + 3 - 4 -3 + 6 — 6 - 2
Basic Material
Value h million +195 + 47 -- + 1 + 6 - 1
per cent + 19 + 4 -- -- - 1 + 1
Volume per cent + 10 - 3 -1 - 2 - 1 + 1
Fuels
Value £j million + 172 + 9 + 3 -20 - 2 + 18
per cent + 24 + .1 +2 - 9 - 1 + 8
Volume per cent + 6 + 7 + 4 - 6 — + 10
Manufactures
Value h million + 828 + 324 -17 +52 +39 + 29
per cent + 30 + 9 -2 + 6 + 4 + 3
Volume per cent + 14 + 5 -2 + 5 + 2 + 1
Total Imports
Value h million +1314 + 384 — — + 57 + 13 + 39
per cent + 20 + 5 -- + 3 + 1 + 2
Volume per cent + 9 + 1.5 -1 + 2 + 1
Source; National Institute of Economic and Social Research, National 
Institute Economic Review, Vol. 51 (February, 1970), p. 13.
57
68
The rise in the volume of finished manufactures is more 
puzzling, for it is in this category that the devaluation response 
could have been expected to be most powerful, and where it was 
hoped that the substitution of domestically produced goods would 
occur.
There are certain considerations on the other side. First, 
the only group actually to show a substantial fall between the first 
and last quarters of the year was food and tobacco; the decline in 
finished manufactures was minimal, and in total manufactures there 
was a small rise. This pattern is the reverse of what might have 
been expected. Second, as already noted in connection with the be­
havior of finished manufactures, the level of the first quarter of 
1968 was unusually high, following big increases both in that 
quarter and the previous one. Thus in the second half of 1968 
total manufactures were some 14- percent above the average of 1967. 
But while the plateau in the level of imports might be ascribed, 
with these reservations, to the slow working of devaluation, the 
level of that plateau has still to be accounted for. An alterna­
tive explanation is that they were the result of both other factors 
and an increase in the propensity to import. Such an explanation 
would be consistent with that suggested, more tentatively, in the 
case of exports; so that in both cases a rather sudden deterioration 
in underlying competitiveness could be assumed to have taken place. 
If this is right, then the original devaluation expectations have 
been disappointed because they failed to foresee a sharp deterior­
ation in the underlying situation, which had been demonstrated in 
the sharp rise of the domestic price level during 1967.
69
Disaggregation of the import bill is of little help in sug­
gesting any positive conclusion; but it clarifies the record for 
1968. Table 16 sets out the main volume and volume change by 
broad category of inports both for the whole years 1968 and 1969, 
and for the separate quarters of 1969. It shows that the restrained 
rise in the total volume of goods imported in 1969 was associated 
with falls of 4- and 3 percent respectively, in two major categories 
(foods, beverages and tobacco, and basic materials), which were not 
thought particularly sensitive to devaluation. Fuels grew by 7 
percent and manufactures by 5 percent. The latter rate of growth 
is certainly below the coverage of recent years since 1966, although 
not particularly abnormal in relation to earlier years of relatively 
slow, or, as in 1958, zero growth.
Price changes more or less cancelled the sharp rise in the 
volume of fuel imports, and also largely offset the volume falls in 
food, beverages and tobacco, and the basic materials. In the case 
of manufactures, the volume rise was complemented by price increases, 
so that manufactured imports accounted for all but one-fifth of the 
rise in the total value of goods imported in 1969.
Summary
In summary, indome and changes of stockbuilding mainly 
determine the British inports. As to the lack of inportance of 
relative price changes, our finding is not inconsistent with those 
obtained by other investigators. The insignificant relative price 
variable and the lower elasticity of import with respect to price 
furnishes the explanation for the rise in imports after devaluation.
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We have found that the level of imports rose between 1967 
and 1968 by substantially more than would have been expected on 
the basis of past regression relationships. This either leaves no 
room for any response to devaluation or it implies that the devalu­
ation response was overwhelmed by a rise in the propensity to import 
and by special factors; and it must also include some arbitrariness. 
The point of putting down actual figures is not to pretend to pre­
cision in projection where there can be none, but to try to set 
out the judgments which underlie the estimate.
There is some evidence that special factors inflated the 
import bill, and some reason to believe that unrecorded stockbuild­
ing was large; there is also some reason to think that original 
expectations have been over-optimistic, and cause to suppose that 
underlying British import competitiveness declined sharply during 
1967 and early 1968.
Despite the marked decline in import growth on the basis 
of the results of 1969, it is still impossible to say whether 
devaluation has begun to exert any significant effects on imports 
of Britain. It is not defensible on econometric grounds, nor can 
we, with the statistical techniques at our disposal, disern a sig­
nificant devaluation effect on imports.
CHAPTER VI
THE GENERAL ECONOMIC EFFECT OF DEVALUATION
Using the regression analysis in Chapters V and VI, we 
evaluated empirically the effects of 1957 devaluation on British 
exports and imports. In the meantime, we tested the general val­
idity of both theories of price and income approaches to devalua­
tion and found their arguments generally true. But the conclusions 
hold only if it is assumed that other things are equal. In fact, 
devaluation in November, 1967, was followed by a series of policy 
changes designed to restrain domestic expenditures. Of course, we 
realize that it is difficult to isolate the effects of these other 
policy changes which were undertaken simultaneously with devaluation. 
Nevertheless, we will discuss these other polciy changes separately 
in this chapter in an attempt to examine the direct effect of de­
valuation on absorption and in turn on balance of trade. In 
addition, an assessment of the cost of devaluation will also be 
included in this chapter.
The Income-Absorption Analysis of Devaluation
Measured in real terms, an improvement in the balance of
trade is similar to a reduction in absorption under the condition
of full enployment.
As Table 18 shows, of the L252 million by which the trade
balance in constant prices was improved in the 1967-68 period,
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L2M-3 million was made available by increased output not absorbed 
by consumption, government expenditure on goods and services, and 
capital formation,^ The remaining t 9 million came out of changes 
in inventories from L169 million in 1967 to L160 million in 1968.
TABLE 17
UNITED KINGDOM GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 




Consumer's expenditure 22,039 22,562 22,520
Government expenditure 5,825 5,851 5,815
Gross domestic fixed 
investment 6,525 6,791 6,619
Changes in stocks 169 160 302
Exports of goods and 
services 6,564 7,321 7,968
Imports of goods and 
services -7,104 -7,609 -7,767
Total GDP 34,018 35,076 35,557
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop­
ment, Main Economic Indicators (Paris: OECD), 1968, 1969# 1970,
^The L252 million trade balance of 1968 is obtained by the 
increase of exports (7,321-6,564) minus the increase of imports 
(7,609-7,104) in the 1967-68 period. For data consult Table 17. 
Alternatively, this can be computed by the income-absorption formu-
la: total product minus total expenditures (personal consumption
expenditure + public expenditure + fixed capital formation) =*= change 
in stocks. For example, in the 1967-68 period, 1,058 - (523 + 26 + 266) 
+ 9 = 252. For figures, consult Table 18.
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TABLE 18-
CHANGES IN COMPONENTS OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
OF UNITED KINGDOM BETWEEN, 1967 AND 1968, 
1967 AND 1969 
(Pouild mill i oh)
1967-68 1967-69
Total gross domestic product +1,058 +1,539
Consumption +523 +581
Public expenditure + 2 6 - 10
Fixed capital formation +266 + 94
Excess of increase of total 
domestic expenditure over 
increase of consumers and 
public expenditures, and 
fixed capital formation 243 874
Changes in stocks - 9 + 133
Trade balance (Exports - Imports) 252 741
Source: Rearrangement of Table 17.
By the same token, in the 1967-69 period, of the L791 
million by which the trade balance (in constant prices) was improved, 
L874- million was made available by increased output not absorbed 
by personal consumption, government expenditure in goods and ser­
vices, and capital formation. But this amount was drawn down to 
L741 million by an increase in inventories of L133 million from 
L169 million in 1967 to L302 million in 1969, as shown in Table 
17 and Table 18.
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The improvement in the trade balance, in constant prices, 
in the 1967-68 period was brought about by an increase of exports 
of t 757 million (which is obtained by subtracting L6,564 million 
from L7,321 million), while imports increased by L505 million 
(which is obtained by subtracting imports of 1967, 17,104 million 
from imports of 1968, 17,609 million). By the same token, the im­
provement in constant prices during the 1967-69 period was brought 
about by an increase of exports of 11404 million, while imports 
increased by 1663 million.
Internal Financial Policy
From the preceding section, we find the improvement of the 
balance of trade in both the 1967-68 and 1967-69 periods was brought 
about, to some extent, by the reduction in public expenditure.
This implies that the internal policies might have played some 
role in improving the balance of trade. In this section, we attempt 
to examine the effects of the internal policy changes which were 
undertaken simultaneously with devaluation.
Devaluation on November 18, 1967, was followed by a series
of policy changes designed to restrain domestic expenditures and to
make room in the economy for a new phase of export-oriented growth.
Measures to shift resources from domestic use toward improvement of
2the current foreign balance were taken in four stages.
In November, 1967, at the time of devaluation, the bank 
rate was raised to 8 percent, and banks were requested to hold
^Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
Economic Outlook, No. 3 (July, 1968), pp. 81-82.
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loans at the then existing levels. At the same time, certain 
measures to become effective in fiscal 1968-69 were announced, 
including a L200 million cut in public expenditure plans, with­
drawal of the selective employment tax premium from all manu­
factures outside the development area, and abolition of the 
export rebate.
In January, 1968, further cuts in public expenditure 
plans of L300 million in 1968-69 and Î.4-16 million in 1969-70 
were announced.
In March, 1970, the budget-imposed tax increase was 
estimated to yield more than L900 million in a full year. The 
measure mainly affected indirect taxes and the corporation 
tax; the standard rate of income tax remained unchanged.
Taking account of higher family allowances, the net increase 
in taxation amounted to L84-0 million. The impact on demand 
was estimated to amount to an annual rate of L500-600 million 
by the end of 1968.
In May, 1970, the ceiling on bank advances was extend­
ed to cover all lending to the private sector, including 
exports.
Direct Effects of Devaluation on Absorption 
As we discussed in Chapter II, effects of devaluation 
on the balance of trade which are not associated with changes 
in income but with changes in the absorption of given income
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are called direct effects on absorption.
The magnitude of direct effects of devaluation on ab­
sorption depends on the extent of the rise in price level, 
which reduces the real demand for goods and services (1) 
through its effect on real liquid assets, (2) through the re­
distribution of income from fixed-income groups to wage-and- 
profit earners, (3) or through progressive taxation— as 
income rises in monetary terms the real burden of taxation be­
comes higher. Insofar as the government spends no extra rev­
enue but accumulates it in a budget surplus, there is a defla­
tionary effect on consumption. However, it is doubtful that 
such was the case in Britain, since the preparation of the 
British government’s budget is based on the real expenditures 
deemed necessary.
The effect of rising price levels on investment is a 
complex relationship. The direct impact of devaluation can be 
only roughly estimated on consumption alone.
It is possible that a large increase in consumers’ goods 
prices would have produced a measurable reduction in real con­
sumption expenditure. However, the actual rise of the retail 
price index after devaluation was quite small. Price controls, 
wage policy, and long-term contracts setting inport prices 
for many commodities all served to dampen the effects of de­
valuation on domestic price levels.
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The retail price index rose from 115.3 in 1967 to 120.7 
in 1968 (about 9.6 percent) from 120.7 in 1968 to 127 in 1969 
(about 5.3 percent) .
TABLE 19
THE CHANGES OF PRICES OF SOME SELECTED COMMODITIES 




















1967 111.1 109,8 119.5 111.9 121.8 123.2 105.0 113.3
2̂ 109.9 112.0 115.5 112.3 122.9 123.2 105.5 113.9
Q3 110.0 112.0 119.9 112.1 122.3 125.0 105.9 115,3
Q9 111.0 113.6 116.3 112.3 122.3 126.2 107.7 116.0
Year 110.5 112.0 115.3 111.8 120.8 125.2 106.1 119.7
1968 112.2 119.1 117.9 113.3 121.9 127.9 108.9 119.6
Q2 115.0 119.9 120.7 119.3 126.3 128.7 109.9 120.3
Q3 116.3 115.1 121.3 115.7 126.1 130.5 109.5 121.9
Q9 116.1 115.2 122.8 117.2 127.7 132.3 110.9 120.2
Year 119.8 119.8 120.7 115.2 125.7 130.7 112.8 120.5
1969 116.8 118.0 125.2 118.5 133.9 132.9 111.7 129.2
Q2 117.8 119.5 127.2 121.3 139.1 133.5 112.7 125.9
Qb 119.2 121.9 127.9 121.8 139.3 138.3 119.3 126.9
Q9 121.8 129.1 129.1 123.3 137.9 191.1 116.9 128.0
Year 127.2 121.5 135.2 136.9 115.9 126.2
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 52 (May, 1970), Statistical
Appendix, Table 7.
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Since there is no way to measure precisely the impact on 
absorption of such a small rise in prices, on the basis of the ex­
tent of the rise of price level after devaluation we can only 
roughly conclude that the direct effects of devaluation on absorp­
tion mighr be minimal.
Income Expansion and Absorption
An improvement in the trade balance without a reduction in 
absorption is possible only to the extent that income is increased 
without parallel increase in absorption. The proportion of the in­
crease in national income which is spent, other things being equal, 
will depend on the rise in consumption, which in turn depends on the 
increase in disposable income and on marginal propensity to consume 
or to save.
As Table 20 shows, LI,743 million of the L4,250 million 
increase in gross national expenditure, or 68 percent, went to 
disposable income in the 1967-68 period. The increase in personal 
savings in 1968 over 1967 was insignificant in comparison to the in­
crease in disposable income. Thus, the shiphoning-off of the increase 
in gross national product into taxes and gross business savings was 
not large enough to make significant contributions to restraining 
the rise of consumption.
When we look at the 1967II-69I period, the picture, however, 
is quite different. The increase in personal savings in the first 
year of 1969 over the second half of 1967 was tremendous in compar­
ison to the increase of disposable income. The drain-off of the in­
crease in gross national product into taxes and savings did make a
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TABLE 20
UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL INCOME COMPONENTS 
1967-68, 1967II-69I 
(Pound billion)
1967 1968 Increase 1967II 19691 Increase
Gross national 
expenditure 9-7,174 51,379 4,250 23,806 26,329 3,523
Disposable
income 27,522 29,265 1,743 14,174 15,064 890
Consumer
expenditure 25,339 27,605 1,726 13,192 13,930 538
Personal
savings 2,183 2,200 17 982 1,325 382
Source: Calculated from: Central Statistical Office,
Economic Trend, No. 192 (October, 1969), Appendix Table.
great contribution to checking the rise of consumption. This im­
plies that the improvement in the trade balance during the 1967II- 
691 period was, to some extent, due to lower marginal propensity 
to consume or higher marginal propensity to save.
The Terms-of-Trade Cost of Devaluation 
Having examined the gains of devaluation in the previous 
sections, we attempt to evaluate the cost of devaluation in this 
section.
The price indices in Table 21 show that prices of both 
imports and exports rose between 1967 and 1969 and also that im­
port prices rose more rapidly than export prices. This second
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TABLE 21
IMPORT AND EXPORT PRICES, AND TERMS OF TRADE 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1967-59 
(Index number, 1967 = 100)
Year Import Price Export Price Terms of Trade
( W
1967 100.0 100.0 100.0
1968 110.4 107.2 97.1
1969 115.0 110.9 96.1
Source: Calculated from: National Institute of Economic
and Social Research, National Institute Economic Review, No. 52 
(May, 1970), Statistical Appendix.
aspect, the changing relation between import and export prices, is 
described as the change in the terms of trade, as shown in Table 21. 
Import prices rising relative to export prices add to a country's 
balance of payments problem since imports become more costly in 
terms of exports. Such a relative price movement is called an ad­
verse movement in terms of trade. Conversely, a fall in import 
prices relative to export prices is a favorable movement in the 
terms of trade.
Between 1967 and 1968, as has been shown in Table 21, both 
import and export prices rose. The official price index numbers 
(1967 = 100) for 1968 were: exports, 107.2; imports, 110.4, given
the terms-of-trade index of 97.1, which shows a deterioration of 
3 percent on the average of the two years. Annual values of imports 
and exports in 1967, 1968 and 1969 were as follows:
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TABLE 22
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS ON BALANCE OF TRADE DEFINITIONS 
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(Pound Million)
Years Imports Exports Visible Balance of Trade
1967 6,1+36 5,228 -1,208
1958 7,896 6,1+32 -1,1+61+
1969 8,328 7,336 - 992
Source: National Institute of Economics and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 52 (May, 1970), Statistical 
Appendix.
During the interval between the two years, the visible balance 
of trade declined by L256 million. The value of imports in 1968 
would have been L7,656.4 million, obtained from the recorded value 
multiplied by the terms of trade, and the visible deficit in 1968 
would have been tl,12M-.*+ million instead of LI,*+61+ million. Thus 
the effect of the greater increase in import prices was to increase 
the deficit on the visible balance by L339,6 million, so that the 
increasing deficit on the visible balance between 1967 and 1968 
could mainly be attributed to the adverse movement in the terms of 
trade. By the same token, the effect of the increase in import 
prices was to increase the deficit on the visible balance of trade 
by L331.1 million, so that the deficit on the visible balance should 
be L656.9 million instead of L990 million in 1969.
The results obtained by these calculations are inevitably
only rough measurements. The measurements, therefore, are intended
S2
only to bring out the quantitative importance of relative price 
changes. What we have tried to do is to give some idea of the 
orders of magnitude involved.
The Effects of Devaluation on the Visible 
and Invisible Trade of Balance 
In the preceding sections, we examined the effects of devalu­
ation on exports and imports of goods and services taken together.
In this section, we atteiiçt to investigate the effects of devaluation 
on goods and services taken separately.
General Assessments 
The balance of trade since devaluation has been most dis- 
apppointing and, in spite of favorable circumstances, it has fallen 
short of official expectations of an improvement of tSOO million 
per year. In the invisible account, however, there has been an in­
crease in net income from investment, and the travel balance also 
appears to have benefited substantially. In the visible trade 
account, the effects of devaluation so far have not been very favor­
able in the 1967-68 period. Despite the favorable effect of the 
dock strike, there was deterioration in the visible trade balance 
by tl50 million in 1968, as shown in Table 23, compared with 1967.
At tSOO million, the 1968 deficit was the largest in the history 
of the U. K.
Various explanations can be given for this disturbing situ­
ation. There is some evidence, for exanple, that the underlying 
British conpetitiveness was deteriorating sharply before devalu­
ation, and on the inport side there were certainly some special
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factors operating in favor of raising the level of imports.
Another possibility is that, in the short run at any rate, 
the volume of United Kingdom trade is much less responsive to price 
change than had commonly been supposed.
It would certainly be premature as yet to pass a final 
judgment on the effectiveness of devaluation. It may be that much 
of its effects have been merely delayed. It is, however, clear that 
the present competitive position of the United Kingdom is not as 
strong as had been hoped for on the basis of its trade showing in 
1968.
However, if one looks at the 1967 figure, the picture appears 
much more optimistic. As Table 24- shows, the current balance for 
1969 had a surplus as high as L275 million, which was an improvement 
of nearly L650 million from 1968. This can be interpreted as evi­
dence of the impact of devaluation.
Visible Trade Balance
Without the delays caused by the dock strike in the fall 
of 1967, the deterioration in the balance of visible trade in 1968 
would probably have been about t375 million, according to the
3estimate of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Of this L375 million, L300 million is attributable to a decline of 
some 3 percent in the terms of trade and a rise of about 11.5 percent 
in inport prices partly balanced by the rise of 8 percent in export 
prices.
3National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 4-7 (February, 1969), p.24-.
Ibid.
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In 1969, it was the improvement in the balance of visible 
trade which accounted for the largest part of the turn around in 
the current balance of trade. Of the total improvement in the 
visible balance of nearly t4-80 million, as shown in Table 24, some 
was due to a drop in payments for military aircraft and missiles 
imported from the United States; but the rise in the value of other
imports was offset by an increase in the value of exports.
Three quarters of the increase in the value of imports of 
goods in 1969 was due to the rise in import p r i c e s T h e  total 
volume of imports remained unchanged during the year and (excluding 
United States military aircraft) increased by more than .5 percent 
a year. As for exports, the reverse was true, with volumes up by
more than twice the unit value. The fact that the increase in the
value of imports was mostly due to the rise in import prices might 
help explain away the puzzle that imports that had risen continually 
rose after devaluation.
Invisible Trade Balance
The surplus on invisible transactions was about tl5Q million 
higher in 1968 than in 1967, as shown in Table 24. Of this, some 
was attributable to non-payment of the annual interest on the North 
American loans, which is subject to deferment provisions. Together 
with the favorable effects of devaluation on earnings in sterling 
terms, this helped net investment income to recover considerably 
in spite of the big service charges which resulted from the contin­
uing high bank rates and outstanding international assistance.
^National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 51 (February, 1970), p. 14.
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TABLE 23
UNITED KINGDOM BALANCE OP PAYMENTS, 1967-68
(B million)
1967 1968











































































Invisible balance +233 + 50 +111 +110 +109 +380

















Balance - 86 -133 - 9 +192 - 65 - 15
Normal balancing item 
(Seasonally adjusted)
+ 60 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 15 + 60
Basic balance -430 -269 -143 +131 - 94 -375
Less seasonal adjustments -- + 37 + 26 - 47 - 16 — —
Basic balance (actual) -430 -232 -117 + 84 -110 -375
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
National Institute Economic Review, No. 47 (February, 1969), p. 23.
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TABLE 24
UNITED KINGDOM BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1968-69
(L million)
1968 1969
Year Ol O 2 S O 4 Year
Current transactions
(Seasonally adjusted)
Exports 6,233 1,779 1,803 1,796 1,832 7,010
Imports 6,910 1,645 1,725 1,808 1,832 7,210
Visible balance -677 -134 - 78 + 12 — — -200
Shipping + 61 + 8 + 5 + 3 + 4 -+:20
Civil aviation + 20 + 14 + 9 + 10 + 12 + 45
Travel + 11 + 8 + 11 + 10 + 11 + 40
Other non-government
services +441 + 108 +121 +127 +124 +480
Government
Services -284 - 71 - 69 - 71 - 74 -285
Transfers -178 - 47 - 42 - 45 — 46 -180
Other transfers - 78 - 20 - 22 - 23 - 25 - 90
Property income
Public -235 - 76 - 93 - 83 - 88 -340
Private +654 + 239 + 226 +205 +215 + 885
Invisible balance -412 +163 +146 +133 +133 +575
+ 375
Current balance -265 + 29 + 68 +145 +133
Long-term capital
(Seasonally adjusted)
Government + 21 - 44 - 27 + 12 - 41 -100
Other -163 - 43 + 34 + 61
Balance -142 - 87 + 7 + 73
Balancing item
(Seasonally adjusted) -130 +137 - 28 - 74
Basic balance -537 + 79 + 47 +144
(Seasonally adjusted)
Less seasonal adjustments — + 12 + 70 + 11
Basic balance(unadjusted)-537 + 91 +117 +155 -93
Source; National Institute of Economic and Social
Research, National Institute Economic Review, No. 51 (February,
1970), p. T51-- --------------------------------
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In addition, there must have been improvement in the ship­
ping and the travel accounts, resulting probably in a substantial 
surplus in these accounts. Since the restriction on travel expendi­
ture remained in force through the year, the effects of devaluation 
on sterling unit costs, particularly fares, helped to bring about a 
IM- percent increase in the number of incoming tourists.^
In 1969 the invisible trade surplus improved by L160 million, 
as shown in Table 24, despite the resumption of full service of the 
North American loans. There was a particularly large surplus in the 
first quarter of the year which was not afterwards maintained; it 
appears to have been due to erratically large figures relating to 
oil companies’ transactions.
The chief factor in the improvement in the invisible balance 
of trade was a big rise in net investment income. As a result 
mainly of large-scale official borrowing from overseas in 1968 and 
the resumption of the 1945 loans from the United States and Canada, 
net payments by the public sector were about tlOO million higher.
But the private sector’s net earnings increased much more. There 
was a big rise in income from direct investment overseas, particu­
larly in oil, where the return on foreign private investment in 
this country was relatively low.
The balance on services has improved by about L50 million 
in the 1968-59 period. Miscellaneous private services were respons­
ible for practically all the net gain in the first quarter. With 
restrictions still in effect on tourist expenditure in the
®Ibid.
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non-sterling area and receipts still apparently stimulated by the 
effects of devaluation, net travel earnings rose, and the upward 
trend in net earnings from civil aviation was resumed after a check 
attributable to the strike of BOAC pilots in 1968. Despite the 
improvement in the balance of trade, net shipping earnings declined, 
apparently because of the fall in tanker rates, while the deficit 
on government transfer payments increased, particularly the contri­
butions to international organizations and private unilateral trans­
fer.
Summary
The overall current account of the United Kingdom balance 
of payments between 1967 and 1968 improved to a minor extent. How­
ever, the deterioration in the visible balance of trade was offset 
to a certain extent by a substantial increase in the invisible 
balance. The gain in invisible trade was mainly in the miscellan­
eous categories. Though the components of this group are not item­
ized, one can conclude that increased net earnings on oil trans­
actions--* development not attributable to devaluation— was respons­
ible for most of the gain.
The improvements in the trade balance were minimal (since 
prices rose very littlé) after devaluation was favorably implemented 
by internal financial devaluation on absorption (which could have 
been produced by a rise in the price level).
The improvement in the trade balance which occurred in 1968 
and 1969 was accomplished by (a) increased output not absorbed and 
(b) disinvestment in inventories. This strongly supports the prop­
osition of the income-absorption approach.
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A deterioration in the terms of trade was, of course, a 
natural consequence of devaluation. But the 3 percent deterioration 
in terms of trade in the 1967-68 period was not large. It had, how­
ever, been supposed that the deterioration on this account would be 
more than balanced by a higher rate of growth in the volume of ex­
ports and a lower rate of growth in the volume of imports. But in 
practice the volume of exports appears at best to have risen only 
slightly in relation to world trade, and the volume of imports 
rose more in relation to United Kingdom output than might reasonably 
have been expected in the light of past propensities. The terms 
of trade were more favorable in the early part of 1969 than they had 
been in 1968; but thereafter they worsened slightly from quarter to 
quarter and for the year as a whole showed a marginal deterioration.
The improvement in the trade balance was made possible, to a 
great extent, by increased output which was not absorbed. The effec­
tiveness of the exchange rate adjustment was undoubtedly helped by 




The most immediate economic development leading to devalu­
ation in 1967 were the sharp deterioration of Britain’s trade bal­
ance through November of that year and the great loss of competi­
tive strength in terms of the share of trade in the world market 
(a 62 percent drop from 18.1 percent of 1958 to 11.9 percent of 
1967). In addition, it was thought— there a notion, held and openly 
expressed by influential circles— that Britain's balance-of-payments 
problem was due to the weakness of her currency.
The export performance of the United Kingdom has improved 
to a certain extent since devaluation. Our study finds that, in 
the first year, the contribution of devaluation was very slight.
The growth in the imports was highly disappointing, ft>r imports 
continued to rise and appeared very strong in the first year after 
devaluation. However, the loss due to the unfavorable visible 
trade had been offset to a great extent by a clear gain in invisible 
trade caused by an increase in net income from investment and an 
improvement in the travel balance.
The explanation for the disappointing export situation is 
that the underlying ability to export was deteriorating rather
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sharply just before devaluation. The more serious this deterior­
ation, the larger the corresponding devaluation effects would have 
to be to offset it.
Furthermore, the continuous rise of imports after devalua­
tion was also due to the fact that relative price variable was not 
a significant determinant of imports in the case of Britain and that 
the elasticity of imports with respect to price was fairly low. 
Further analysis suggests that abnormal increases in silver and dia­
mond imports, the effect of the 1967 dock strike, the increase in 
the propensity to import, and special factors all were the contrib­
utory factors. The basic factors show that the level of imports 
rose between 1967 and 1968 by substantially more than would have 
been expected on the basis of past regression relationships. Thus 
the devaluation response was overwhelmed by a rise in the propensity 
to import and by special factors.
The export picture in 1969 was rather different. Exports 
continued to rise in 1969, and there was very noticeable slackening 
in the rate of growth of the volume of imports in 1969. The main 
reason for the slower growth of imports was due to the slower 
growth of final demand not devaluation.
The invisible trade surplus continued to rise through 1969 
primarily as a result of large increases in direct investment over­
seas, particularly in oil— a development not attributable to devalu­
ation.
Our study finds, however, that the share of trade of the 
United Kingdom resumed a slight downward trend in 1969 after a period
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of relative stability in 1968. Nevertheless, the total fall in share 
of trade, year on year, was the smallest since 1961. The serious 
deterioration of export before devaluation could have led to even 
slower export growth if devaluation had not been adopted. This 
implies that devaluation and price advantage h>. ve played some role 
in offsetting the deterioration.
The effectiveness of devaluation was supported by other 
policies aimed at curtailing absorption. The improvement in the 
United Kingdom balance of trade in 1968, according to our study, 
was made possible mainly by the increased output and export plus a 
small drawing-down of inventories, but in 1969 it was made totally 
by the increased export and the increased output not absorbed.
Our study has found that the main determinants of exports 
of the United Kingdom are the income of the other countries, and 
relative prices. Our findings as to the importance of lagged 
effects of relative prices on the level of exports shed some light 
on the current literature of the international price adjustment 
mechanism. It indicates that if lagged effects are considered, the 
picture of past empirical results could be completely different.
Our findings demonstrate that the empirical evidence supports the 
theoretical arguments of both the price-elasticities and income- 
absorption approaches.
With regard to imports, our study finds that it is income 
or consumption and changes of stockbuilding that primarily determine 
the level of imports. As to the lack of importance of relative 
prices, our finding is not inconsistent with those obtained by 
other investigators.
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In regard to the itiçact of devaluation on prices and wages, 
it appeared rather moderate. The small increase in export prices 
in terms of local currency meant that the reduction in the real 
value of sterling balance held abroad was materialized only to a 
minor extent.
The cost of devaluation to the United Kingdom due to the 
unfavorable terms of trade, however, was high. The terms of trade 
were more favorable in the early part of 1969 than they had been in 
1968; but thereafter they worsened slightly from quarter to quarter 
and the year as a whole showed a marginal deterioration.
The unfavorable findings about the short-run effects of de­
valuation may appear to support the more pessimistic views of 
exchange-rate adjustment as an equilibrating device.
The contribution of devaluation toward alleviating Britain’s 
balance of payments problem in the two-year period was small, other 
than its effect in reversing the speculation against sterling. It 
seems that the exchange rate adjustment in its two-year period can­
not be deemed a success. Though the effects were small, we do not 
know what the development of Britain’s international transactions 
would have been if she had not devalued. In the negative sense of 
preventing deterioration of the British international balance, the 
devaluation of 1967 might have made some contribution.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I 
DATA USED IN EXPORT REGRESSION FUNCTION
(1958 = 100)
Year X IP Pi P2 Pl/P2
1960 I 916 115 103 103 1.000
II 891 118 103 103 1.000
III 881 113 103 103 1.000
IV 901 118 103 103 1.000
1961 I 895 116 103 101 1.020
II 896 119 104 103 1.010
III 911 122 104 103 1.010
IV 896 125 104 103 1.010
1962 I 908 126 105 103 1.019
II 941 128 105 103 1.019
III 941 129 105 103 1.019
IV 923 130 105 103 1.019
1963 I 927 130 106 103 1.029
II 959 134 106 102 1.039
III 988 136 107 102 1.049
IV 991 139 108 103 1.049
1964 I 1,038 142 108 104 1.038
II 1,021 146 109 104 1.048
III 1,008 148 109 105 1.038
IV 1,046 150 110 106 1.038
1965 I 1,063 155 111 106 1.047
II 1,049 155 112 106 1.057
III 1,088 159 113 107 1.056
IV 1,118 161 114 107 1.065
1966 I 1,113 166 115 108 1.065
II 1,092 168 117 108 1.083
III 1,090 170 118 109 1.083
IV 1,146 172 118 108 1.093
1967 I 1,176 169 120 108 1.111
II 1,117 169 120 108 1.111
III 1,087 172 122 108 1.130
IV 1,000 176 114 107 0.986
1968 I 1,221 178 109 108 1.103
II 1,223 179 112 109 1.103
III 1,336 182 112 109 1.103
IV 1,365 186 113 110 1.104
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APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)
Year X IP Pi P2 P 1 /P 2
1969 I 1,342 188 114 112 1.022
II 1,413 197 114 112 1.022
III 1,467 198 114 113 1.023
IV 1,487 200 114 114 1.000
Sources: National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research, National Institute Economic Review: 1962, 1963, 1964 
1965, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1970, Vils. 21, 26, 30, 34, 38, 42, 
50, 54; and United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics;
1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 
Vols. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26.
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APPENDIX II
DATA USED IN IMPORT REGRESSION FUNCTIONS 
(1958 = 100)
Year M GDP C S Pi P2 Pl/P
1960 I 1,123 5,439 3,911 70 100 100 1.000
II 1,141 5,519 4,177. 154 100 100 1.000
III 1,130 5,429 4,139 140 . 99 99 1.000
IV 1,115 5,319 4,307 228 100 100 1.000
1961 I 1,190 5,524 4,190 120 104 97 1.072
II 1,096 5,564 4,198 104 104 99 1.041
III 1,107 5,599 4,226 36 106 97 1.093
IV 1,119 5,547 4,202 37 106 97 1.094
1962 I 1,129 5,472 4,204 -4 107 97 1.103
II 1,165 5,611 4,255 48 108 96 1.125
III 1,203 5,560 4,274 50 109 96 1.135
IV 1,057 5,531 4,318 2 109 97 1.124
1963 I 1,136 5,711 4,360 -17 109 99 1.101
II 1,185 5,960 4,468 70 109 100 1.090
III 1,236 5,939 4,536 3 111 100 1.110
IV 1,234 6,146 4,598 121 111 102 1.088
1964 I 1,353 6,165 4,726 87 111 104 1.067
II 1,390 6,237 4,690 164 112 103 1.087
III 1,387 6,240 4,730 123 114 103 1.107
IV 1,393 6,340 4,797 106 114 103 1.107
1965 I 1,321 6,449 4,869 68 115 104 1.106
II 1,402 6,414 4,744 95 117 104 1.125
III 1,409 6,476 4,819 113 119 103 1.155
IV 1,428 6,555 4,852 89 119 104 1.144
1966 I 1,447 6,578 4,988 77 119 105 1.133
II 1,417 6,256 4,974 50 121 107 1.131
III 1,424 6,566 4,879 96 123 106 1.160
IV 1,328 6,629 4,872 -23 124 106 1.170
1967 I 1.486 6,704 4,967 39 121 105 1.152
II 1,500 6,670 4,963 48 121 104 1.163
III 1,484 6,700 5,083 -32 122 105 1.162
IV 1,547 6,715 5,085 72 122 110 1.109
1968 I 1,643 6,998 5,196 -69 128 117 1.094
II 1,624 6,885 5,005 57 132 117 1.128
III 1,645 7,021 5,008 37 134 118 1.135
IV 1,655 7,186 5,097
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APPENDIX II (CONTINUED)
Year M GDP C S ^ 1 ^ 2  ^1/^2
1969 I 1,650 6,895 5,037 110 138 120 1.150
II 1,682 6,945 5,062 50 140 121 1.160
III 1,659 7,040 5,098 0 140 123 1.140
IV 1,66? ,284 5,098 161 142 125 1.140
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